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ABSTRACT
We unlock our smart devices such as smartphone several times every day using a pin,
password, or graphical pattern if the device is secured by one. The scope and usage of smart
devices’ are expanding day by day in our everyday life and hence the need to make them
more secure. In the near future, we may need to authenticate ourselves on emerging smart
devices such as electronic doors, exercise equipment, power tools, medical devices, and
smart TV remote control. While recent research focuses on developing new behavior-based
methods to authenticate these smart devices, pin and password still remain primary methods
to authenticate a user on a device.
Although the recent research exposes the observation-based vulnerabilities, the popular
belief is that the direct observation attacks can be thwarted by simple methods that obscure
the attacker’s view of the input console (or screen). In this dissertation, we study the users’
hand movement pattern while they type on their smart devices. The study concentrates on
the following two factors; (1) finding security leaks from the observed hand movement
patterns (we showcase that the user’s hand movement on its own reveals the user’s sensitive
information) and (2) developing methods to build lightweight, easy to use, and more secure
authentication system. The users’ hand movement patterns were captured through video
camcorder and inbuilt motion sensors such as gyroscope and accelerometer in the user’s
device.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Research in the past show that the Pin and passwords are susceptible to various attacks such
as dictionary attacks, keylogger attacks, and observation attacks. Observation attacks have
taken another paradigm with emerging video recording and processing devices. Recent
research demonstrates various computer vision based attacks where adversaries observe the
users’ screen and typing hand while they type their pin or password to steal sensitive
information. Most of these attacks rely on the text reconstruction using advanced vision
enhancing methods.
Although the recent research exposes the observation based vulnerabilities, popular
belief is that the direct observation attacks can be thwarted by simple methods that obscure
the attacker’s view of the input console (or screen). In this dissertation, we study the users’
hand movement pattern while they type on their smart devices. The study concentrates on
the following two factors; (1) finding security leaks from the observed hand movement
patterns (we showcase that the users hand movement on its own reveal the user’s sensitive
information) and (2) developing methods to build lightweight, easy to use, and more secure
authentication system. The users’ hand movement patterns were captured through video
camcorder, and inbuilt motion sensors such as gyroscope and accelerometer in the user’s
device.
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We divide the users’ hand movement analysis in two major categories; (1) Video based
analysis, and (2) Motion sensor based analysis.

1. Video Based Analysis - We record a short video clip of the users’ hand movement
while they interact with their devices for Pin or Password entry. By tracking the hand
movement in the target video clip and estimating the keypad location, we decipher the
user’s typing. Specifically, we address security threats posed to users’ Pin and
Password typing behavior.

(a) Attack on the Pin Typing [115]- We design an attack that decodes a users’ Pin
based on the hand movements seen during Pin entry. This kind of attack has
perhaps been possible since the inception of the video camera. More than before
however, the attack represents a very big threat given the prevalence of
camera-enabled devices and the fact that users these days undertake their private
business (on mobile devices) in the open.
(b) Attack on the Password Typing [113]- We present an attack that decodes a
user’s password based on the hand movements recorded in a video clip. The
attack can be executed in such a way as to not raise any suspicions to the user, so
it poses a serious threat with the new range of sophisticated cameras now
introduced in the market (such as smart glasses and smart watches).
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(c) Confidence in the Deciphered Pin or Password - Since the number of
attempts to unlock the target devices is limited to 5-10 guesses before device
gets completely locked or users’ data gets erased from the device, a confidence
measure would be helpful to identify possible incorrect predictions before
entering the deciphered pin or password. Location tracking of an object in a
video is often imprecise. The estimation accuracy of these methods is affected
by several factors such as occlusion, movement, noise, and video quality. The
problem becomes harder when the target object is partially or fully occluded in
the video.
(d) Fusion of Inference Decisions from Multiple Videos - In some scenarios,
adversaries can get multiple videos recording of user’s Pin and (or) password
entry process. We propose a method based on Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) to
fuse the predictions obtained from different videos to get a more reliable
prediction. In the proposed fusion method, we first assign confidence to every
predicted column and row for each available video. Then, using the assigned
confidence measure, we combine the decision from all videos to achieve a better
inference result.
(e) Effect of Various Recording Parameters on Prediction [112]- This work
analyses the existing attacks and proposed methods and investigate various video
recording parameter settings to analyze the effect of these settings on the
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inference of users sensitive information through video recording. The work
considers various realistic scenarios such as different typing style, the angle of
recording, recording frame rate etc. and provides the combination of parameters
which results in high success rate of the attack.
(f) Attack on the Users’ Pin while Typing in the Dark [116] - The methods
presented in the past assume the victim to be present in a well illuminated place.
We propose a novel attack on the smartphone users’ pins that does not require a
highly illuminated room and works even in the complete darkness. The study
proposes to use a DS325 Soft Kinect camera1 to record the users’ interaction
with their smartphones while they type their pins. With the advancements in the
quality and accessibility of the depth-sensing cameras day by day, the success of
the method exposes a major security risk in the present and future for the usage
of the smart devices.

2. Motion Sensor Based Analysis- We use the inbuilt motion sensors (for example,
accelerometer and gyroscope) in the users’ device and collect the hand movement
while they interact with the device using a bluetooth connection with a server
machine2 . The analysis of hand gestures captured through motion sensors explores:
(1) information leaks through observed hand gestures. We analyzed the hand
1

One can use any IR sensor enabled video recording device such as Google Tango and other handheld cameras.
We use DS325 Soft Kinect as an example to conduct the experiments and evaluations.
2
An adversary can steal a targeted user’s hand movements by sending or installing a malicious application on
the user’s device (see [74]).
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movement captured through motion sensor in the user’s device to learn any correlation
between hand movement gestures and brain wave signals. The correlation between
signals can be utilized to attack the one signal having access to the other, and (2)
secure authentication system based on the users’ unique hand gestures. The users’
hand gestures for a particular task presents a unique cognitive signature. We analyzed
the users’ hand gestures while they create few taps on the anchor points on their body
(we call these taps as BodyTaps) and present a novel authentication system that
utilizes the users’ unique hand gestures.
(a) Attack on Users’ Thinking - We simultaneously record users hand movement
through motion sensors using a wrist worn smartwatch and his/her brain wave
signals using a consumer grade Neurosky device. We present the empirical
evidences of the relationship between physiological biometrics stemming from
human brain (EEG) and behavioral biometrics stemming from hand movements.
Based on this correlation between two signals, we propose a novel attack on
EEG-based authentication systems.
(b) Body-Tap Based Authentication System [114]- We present a new
authentication mechanism, Body-Taps, which requires minimal efforts and is
suitable for constrained screen devices. Design of the system is such that it only
requires a user to tap the phone at key anchor points on his/her body. The system
creates a user specific template from the features which capture unique
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movement of the user’s hand through the device for each tap and in between two
taps. System asks the user to enter the previously set Tap-Code (training phase)
for the verification to gain access to the device. If the matching score is higher
than a set user specific threshold, access is granted otherwise access is denied.

1.1 Thesis Statement
The thesis statement of this dissertation is as follows: To proactively uncover potential
security risks posed to smartphone users due to their specific way of interaction with the
smart devices, this dissertation also performs analysis of the user’s unique behavior with the
devices and introduces novel, light weight, easy to use, and more secure behavior based
authentication system to overcome exposed vulnerabilities.
In support of this statement, this dissertation describes the following contributions:
1. We design an attack that decodes a users PIN based on the hand movements seen
during PIN entry. This kind of attack has perhaps been possible since the inception of
the video camera. More than before however, the attack represents a very big threat
given the prevalence of camera-enabled devices and the fact that users these days
undertake their private business (on mobile devices) in the open. Using videos
captured by a set of (affordable) cameras that the common user on the streets typically
owns, we rigorously evaluate the effect of the attack on a large dataset of PINs
randomly generated by our user population. Based on video footage captured by the
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best and worst performing cameras respectively, we find the attack to break 94% and
84% of the PINs in 10 attempts.
2. We design an attack that decodes a user’s password based on the hand movements
recorded in a video clip. The attack can be executed in such a way as to not raise any
suspicions to the user, so it poses a serious threat with the new range of sophisticated
cameras now introduced in the market (such as smart glasses and smart watches).
Using a large dataset of the video recording of user’s hand dynamics while they type
their password on the mobile phone, we show our attack was able to break an average
of over 70% of characters in a password.
3. We design an attack that could decipher the smartphone user’s pin that can be
launched in low light conditions or in complete darkness. The attack uses short video
clips of the user’s hands movements. The attack model does not require any
information from the smartphone screen display in order to be launched. Using a
dataset of 900 short video recordings from 30 volunteer participants, we show our
attack could break 67% of pins in the first 10 attempts. Since hand-held and wearable
devices are emerging with the capability to record 3D videos (for example, Google
Tango), this work has potential to draw attention of security community to take a
closer look at the security measures for smartphone usage.
4. We design a method to assign a confidence value to the inferred touched keys in a
video based side channel attack to steal a user’s Pin. By analyzing the assigned
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confidence measure on a large training dataset, the work presents an empirical
prediction confidence threshold to accept or reject a particular inference.
5. As users type their Pin or password on their mobile phone several times in a day, one
can easily capture multiple videos of the user’s typing while they type their Pin or
password. We present a Dempster Shafer Theory based fusion scheme to combine the
inferences from multiple video sources to get a better and more accurate prediction of
typed pin or password.
6. We proposed a novel attack on EEG-based authentication systems by taking
advantage of the correlation among the hand movements and brainwave signals to
generate fake EEG signals. This work exposes a major threat on EEG-based
authentication mechanisms. An adversary who gains access to the user’s hand
movement patterns and possesses the knowledge of correlation among the hand
movements and the brainwave signals, poses a serious security threat.
7. We proposed a new authentication mechanism, Body-Taps, which requires minimal
efforts and is suitable for constrained screen devices. Design of the system is such that
it only requires a user to tap the phone at key anchor points on his/her body. The
system creates a user specific template from the features which capture unique
movement of the user’s phone movement for each tap and in between two taps.
System asks the user to enter the previously set Tap-Code (training phase) for the
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verification to gain access to the device. If the matching score is higher than a set user
specific threshold, access is granted otherwise access is denied.

1.2 Dissertation Roadmap
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews related literature
on side channel attacks and on behavior based authentication mechanisms. Chapter 3
introduces methods to infer alphanumeric passwords and numeric pins. Chapter 4 presents
attack on the users’ typing in low light condition or in complete dark using 3D video
camera. Chapter 5 introduces a confidence assignment method and an evidence fusion
method to combine inference decisions through multiple videos of the users’ typing. We
introduce a novel attack on the users’ EEG based systems in Chapter 6. Chapter 7
introduces a light weight, easy to use, and secure gesture based authentication system. In the
end, Chapter 8 summarizes this dissertation.
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Attacks on Users’ Pins, Passwords, and Typed Text
Xu et al. [135] show the text reconstruction using a low-resolution video recording of
the fingertip and the screen on which typing is being done. They show the video recording
captured from a long distance such that it was impossible for the user to see the attacker.
They show the attack to work even with the recording of the reflection of the typing finger
and phone screen.
The attack design by Xu at al. was based on the classifier trained on the appearance of
the screen while a particular key is being typed. Their attack model uses the information
from the mobile phone screen display which makes our work different to theirs. For users
who will be able to hide their screen while they type, the attack by Xu et al. will fail. Our
attack model does not require any information from screen display while typing is being
done. We only need a video recording of hand movement and a part of the back of the
mobile phone while typing is being done. Our attack is much easier to launch because of
our relaxed requirement (relative to those in [135]).
The work by Raguram et al. [102] and Backes et al. [18] also shows the text
reconstruction using reflection. In their work, they use state of the art image processing
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techniques to reconstruct the text. The fact that they use the information of display of the
text in the reflection makes their work clearly very different from ours.
The attack design by Balzarotti et al. [20] uses a video recording of user’s typing on the
desktop keyboard. The video recording was done in such way that camera directly points to
the keyboard. Balzarotti et al. used a series of computer vision analysis followed by
language modeling techniques to infer the text typed on the desktop keyboard. They use the
information about which keys are not visible in the video while a particular key is being
pressed and puts them as candidate keys to be pressed. Our work is clearly very different to
the work by Balzarotti et al. Our attack is conducted in such way that it does not need the
keyboard of the mobile phone to be visible.
The attack by Maggi et al. [80] uses the video recording while the user is typing on the
smartphone screen. Their attack takes advantage of display feedback mechanism (the
enlarged key display while it is being typed). In their attack set up, the recording was done
while the camera was directly pointing to the smartphone screen. They use a classifier
trained on the appearance of the enlarged display of characters to determine the characters
typed in a stream of video recording. A similar kind of attack recently been proposed by
Yue et al.[140] on password and text entry process. In their work, they rely on the video
recording of the smartphone screen and fingertip from a distance using advanced
camera-enabled devices such as Google glass. They employ advanced image processing
techniques to estimate the touched locations on the screen which in turn maps to the actual
key presses.
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In all three works by Balzarotti et al. and Maggi et al. and that of Yue et al., the cameras
directly pointed at the keyboard to capture the video of user’s typing, i.e. direct observation
of the appearance of the keyboard or the text typed. In our attack model, we do not use such
a fine-grained information from the screen display. It needs only part of the hand and an
anchor point on the mobile phone to be visible to launch our attack.
We also discuss in brief two side-channel attacks that despite having been evaluated in a
desktop environment help put into context two interesting attributes of our attack. Using a
neural network trained with samples collected from the intended victim, Asonov et al. [16]
showed that acoustic keyboard emanations could be used to retrieve typed text with close to
80% accuracy. This attack was then later refined by Zhuang et al.[143] who recovered up to
96% of typed English characters and 90% of random 5-character passwords (using only
letters) in just a few guesses. A notable aspect of the attack refinement by Zhuang et al. was
the elimination of the training process, making the attack applicable to victims for whom no
previous recordings of keyboard emanations are available. In an attack against the SSH
login mechanism, Song et al. [121] showed that the time intervals between SSH packets
provide a significant amount of information on what users type during an SSH session.
Using an attack tool, build based on Hidden Markov Models, Song et al. [121] showed their
attack to reduce the SSH password search space by up to 50 times on average compared to
exhaustive search.
Like the attack by Zhuang et al.[143], our attack does not require any training phase,
making it applicable to any video on the fly. Meanwhile, compared to the 50× reduction in
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the search space seen with the SSH attacks, our attack reduces the password search space by
over 99% confirming its lethality relative to some of the known attacks on text input.
There is a series of work which explored the vulnerabilities posed by sensor data on the
mobile phone. Cai et al. [30] and Owusu et al. [96] used the accelerometer sensor data to
infer the password typed on the smartphone screen. Miluzzo et al. [91] and Xu et al. [137]
fused accelerometer readings with those of gyroscope readings while typing was being
done. They also implemented an attack to infer password using the orientation and
movement information extracted from mentioned smartphone sensors to determine the keys
being pressed. A recent work by Simon et al. [117] showed an attack to infer the PIN
entered on the smartphone screen. Attack by Simon et al. uses the output from front camera
of the user’s mobile phone and also output from the microphone. The output from
microphone helped in determining the key press as they recorded the vibration sound with
the key touch. Simon et al. used the output from the front camera to estimate the orientation
of the mobile phone at the instance of key touch, which enabled to determine the key being
pressed. To estimate the mobile phone orientation, authors used the movement of user’s
chest and face in the video recording.
Sensors based attack makes an assumption of having access to the user’s smartphone
sensor data [117]. On the other hand, our method is solely based on the user’s hand
movement captured while they type on their smartphone screen from the user. The whole
breed of sensor attacks is different from our attack model as our attack can be executed in
such a way that does not require any information from user’s smartphone.
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2.2 Authentication System Using Behavior Biometrics
The majority of user authentication methods are composed of the characteristics that
users possess, e.g., fingerprint, iris [26], palm print [26], gait [49, 93], and context based
behavior analysis [58, 134], what users know such as pins, and passwords or a combination
of both of the above that includes touch based authentication [27, 45], and speech
recognition [26]. These methods have practical limitations as they require extensive
computation power and can be very taxing for mobile phone devices. On the contrary,
accelerometer and gyroscope based methods do not require excessive computation to
authenticate a device.
Researchers have explored a plethora of motion sensors based authentication schemes
that focus on improving the usability, performance, and memorability to authenticate a
device [44, 68, 69, 88, 101, 132]. The methods based on motion gestures generally follow
two different types of implementations: one relies on the analysis of the position of the
mobile device [38, 42, 50, 75], and the other focuses on the position of the user’s hand [93].
Prior studies [42, 50, 75] have used the accelerometer data in short sessions either from a
customized device or from a common Android device.
Kamil Burda [29] presented a novel approach to authenticate users based on the way
they picked up a smartphone on a table or in their front pockets, an activity performed
frequently every day, using the smartphones accelerometer sensor. Conti et al. [35]
proposed a new biometric measure to authenticate the user of a smartphone: the movement
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the user performed when answering (or placing) a phone call. Luca et al. [36] presented
Back of Device Shapes, a novel authentication method for smartphones that uses the back of
the device for input. Feng et al. [40] proposed two novel methods, a Statistic Method to
intuitively apply the classifier on the statistic features of the data; and a Trajectory
Reconstruction Method to reconstruct the Mobile Device Picking-up (MDP) motion
trajectories and extract specific identity features from the traces. Kunnathu [65] attempted to
build a statistical model to identify a user, based on how the user picked up the phone and
how he/she held the phone to the ear. Lu et al. [79] proposed a new finger-gesture-based
authentication method, where the in-air-handwriting of each user was captured by wearable
inertial sensors. Lee et al. [69] proposed Secure Pick Up (SPU), to authenticate the users,
by implicitly observing the way they bend their arms when they pick up a smartphone to
interact with the device.
Researchers have been working to authenticate users using EEG signals while they
perform certain tasks [59, 61, 100]. In [108], the authors used Functional Near-Infrared
Spectroscopy (fNIRS) as an authentication modality. The paper showed EERs of 0.036 and
0.046 with best channel configuration using Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Naive
Bayes (NB) classifiers respectively. The paper used data recorded from 50 users while the
participants perform simple arithmetic tasks on computer. In another work [15], the authors
used a low cost 14 electrode EMOTIV EPOC device. The participants were asked to
perform three mental imaginary activities for 150 seconds. Authors uses EEG signal and
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SVM as a verifier in their system. All these work were performed using multiple-channel
EEG devices whereas this work was done using a single-channel EEG device.
Related work on smartwatch-based authentication systems have been reported in prior
studies [41, 62, 63, 130]. Kumar et al. [63] described four continuous authentication
methods using the characteristics of arm movements while individuals walk, and achieved
Dynamic False Acceptance Rate, and Dynamic False Reject Rate between 0% and 15% and
0% and 14.62% respectively using different classifiers. Johnston et al. described a biometric
gait recognition technique using the smartwatch data collected from accelerometer and
gyroscope sensors. The classifiers’ accuracy were reported between 92% to 98% for
authentication task.

2.3 Attacks on Users’ Behavioral Biometrics

2.3.1

Attack Models Using the EEG signals

One interesting threat model [86] used EEG signals to leak private data such as a user’s
credit card information, date of birth, area of living, knowledge of persons known to the
user, PIN numbers and user’s bank details. The authors used an EEG gaming device such as
Emotiv EPOC to form a potential attack vector to infer the secret and private information
about the users. Users were shown the visuals of their personal details and EEG signals
were recorded. They used EEG as an external stimulus whereas we sought to predict brain
activity patterns by exploiting interrelation between hand movements and brain activities.
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2.3.2

Attack model on smartwatches

In [107], smartwatches with motion sensors were used to collect data while the users
type PINs on a phone. The authors installed a malware software on the smartwatch, which
sent the data of motion sensors to a centralized server set at remote location via a
smartphone. In another work [133] the authors used the smart watch’s accelerometer and
gyroscope readings to identify the words and sentences typed by the users on a laptop
keyboard. They calculated the distance traveled and rotation of the hand using sensors data.
The authors found that when motion signals was combined with English language patterns
(word/sentence), the information leakage was substantial. Other related works can be found
in [23, 83, 84, 90, 133].
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3. DECIPHERING NUMERIC PINS AND ALPHANUMERIC
PASSWORDS
Use of mobile phones in public places opens up the possibilities of remote side channel
attacks on these devices. We present a video-based side channel attack to decipher
passwords on mobile devices. Our method uses short video clips ranging from 5 to 10
seconds each, which can be taken unobtrusively from a distance and does not require the
keyboard or the screen of the phone to be visible. By relating the spatiotemporal movements
of the user’s hand during typing and an anchor point on any visible part of the phone, we
predict the typed password with high accuracy. Results on a dataset of 375 short videos of
password entry process on Samsung Galaxy S4 phone show an exponential reduction in the
search space compared to a random guess. For each key-press corresponding to a character
in the passwords, our method was able to reduce the search space to an average of 2-3 keys
compared to ∼30 keys if one has to guess the key randomly. Thus this work reaffirms
threats to smartphone users’ conventional login in public places and highlights the threats in
scenarios such as hiding the screen that otherwise gives the impression of being safe to the
users.
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3.1 Introduction
We propose algorithms and methods to predict passwords by analyzing the underlying
dynamics of hand movements when typing on a mobile phone. The components of our
system include a video clip that provides anchor points on any visible part of the phone and
any visible part of the typing hand. No part of the screen of the phone needs to be visible.
We achieve accuracy as high as 94% in predicting the cluster of keys where each cluster
represents 5-6 spatially close keys on the keyboard. Using keyboard state transition
probability and flight time between keys pressed obtained through analysis of the video
frames, we correctly recognized an average of 70% of the characters in a password.
The process works as follows. Since the geometry of the keyboard on brand name
phones such as iPhone, Samsung Galaxy S4, and HTC One uses a fixed design, we can
locate the keyboard in the video by estimating the location, length, and width of the
keyboard and by relating these dimensions in the video with the physical (known)
dimensions of the keypad by simple geometric transforms between the two. The cues to
deciphering the characters typed include the observations that the hand moves closer to the
keyboard when pressing a key and moves away just after that (see Section 3.3.5 for finer
nuances of this observation).
The prediction of the characters pressed poses specific challenges because any character
can represent a sequence of key presses such as shift key or number key to transforming
from alphabets to numbers and numbers to special characters. For example– to type the
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password Sec@16, a user will press the sequence of keys as Shif t → S → e → c →
N umber key → @ → 1 → 6. Shif t key changes the keyboard state from lowercase
alphabets to uppercase alphabets and N umber key transforms the state from alphabets to
numbers.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work that predicts passwords solely on the
basis of observed hand movements. Figure 3.1 shows the scenario, we analyzed in this
work. It shows, a user is entering the password on his mobile phone, and an adversary with
a camera is capturing the video from a distance such that mobile phone screen is not visible
and hence gives an illusion to the user of being safe. In the same fashion, an adversary can
capture the video from a more sophisticated camera with optical zoom facility which
enables to capture video from a remote distance. We performed our analysis on the
password entry videos on Samsung Galaxy S4 phone and video captured by a range of video
recorders starting from HTC One mobile phone camera with no optical zoom to Sony
camcorder with high optical zoom capability.
The following are the contributions of the work:
1. We design an attack that decodes a user’s password based on the hand movements
recorded in a video clip. The attack can be executed in such a way as to not raise any
suspicions to the user, so it poses a serious threat with the new range of sophisticated
cameras now introduced in the market (such as smart glasses and smart watches).
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Fig. 3.1.: An adversary recording the visible hand movements to infer the password being
typed on the mobile phone screen. A user is typing his password on the mobile phone screen
and the adversary is recording the video using a video recorder.

2. Using a large dataset of the video recording of user’s hand dynamics while they type
their password on the mobile phone, we show our attack was able to break an average
of over 70% of characters in a password.
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3. The users have a strong conviction that covering the screen while entering a password
at a public place adequately secures the password against eavesdropping attacks. Our
findings provide an evidence against the notion because all the videos used in the
study have no part of the screen visible.

3.1.1

Discussion – Follow-up Potential Adversarial Scenarios

A 70%-character guess of user’s passwords provides significant leverage to an attack
because it opens several follow up adversarial possibilities. Below we list some of these
possibilities.
1. Reused Credential Attack - Although research in the past has shown that reusing
credentials across applications and websites puts a user at security risk [7, 11], several
users still reuse their passwords across applications. An attacker could easily launch
an attack on other linked sites for such a user. Research also suggests that a single
good credential could lead to a bigger organizational level attack [5, 10] and hence
our work exposes the possibility of such an attack by using video based channels to
obtain credentials of potential users.
2. Targeted User Attack Since the users type their passwords several times in a day, an
adversary could obtain multiple videos of a target user over time and obtain a better
estimate over time. Also, for a targeted user, an adversary could combine other
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personal information about the user to get a better estimate of the password in fewer
guesses.
3. Credential Trading - Credential trading is another motivation behind the credential
thefts. The attacks such as ours can be utilized by adversaries for trading the users
passwords. These traded partial (or complete) passwords might lead to a bigger
attack[4].
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We discuss related work in Section 3.2.
Section 3.3 discusses the data sets and the detailed attack process. We present the attack
results in Section 6.5 and broader implications and our conclusions in Section 5.6.

3.2 Related Work
Recent research show possibility of exploiting video based side channels to steal the
smart device user’s sensitive information [18, 19, 20, 32, 80, 102, 115, 135, 138, 141].
A very closely related work to this work is our previous work on user’s Pin entry process
on the mobile phones [115]. The attack was shown to work with the video recording of a
user’s hand movement while not compromising any information from the mobile phone
screen display. The attack design in [115] is suitable for numeric Pins, but given the
complexity of keyboard for password or text input, the attack would fail due to the close
proximity of key locations and change of keypad state from characters to numbers and to
special characters. The attack presented in this work differs in several ways; (1) we consider
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the keypad state transitions in the attack, (2) we estimate the fingertip movement by using
the observed typing hand point location in each frame. This gives us better estimate of the
key touched considering the spatially close keys in an alphanumeric keypad, (3) the attack
presented in this work does not rely solely on one point tracked on the typing hand but
rather takes multiple points to track and fuses the tracked results to get a better estimate of
hand movement, and (4) we build a password language model to get a better prediction in
case of lexical patterns in the user’s passwords.
Another closely related work to this work is by Xu et al. [135]. Xu et al. show the text
reconstruction using a low-resolution video recording of the fingertip and the screen on
which typing is being done. They show the video recording captured from a long distance
such that it was impossible for the user to see the attacker. They show the attack to work
even with the recording of the reflection of the typing finger and phone screen.
The attack by Ye et al. [138] utilizes video recordings of the users’ mobile phone screen
to build an attack on the smartphone pattern lock system. Ye et al. show that their attack
could reconstruct over 95% of the graphical patterns in the first five attempts. The work by
Chen et al. [32] show an automated attack for fast inference of number inputs on the mobile
phone screen using video recordings of the users’ screen while they type. Another recent
attack presented by Balagani et al. [19] on ATM pins uses the video recording of screen or
the projector. The attack by Balagani et al. extracts timing information from consecutive
key presses from the recorded video to infer the key sequence being entered on the keypad.
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The attacks presented in [19, 32, 135, 138] were based on the appearance of the screen
while a particular key is being typed. Their attack model uses the information from the
mobile phone screen display which makes our work different to theirs. For users who will
be able to hide their screen while they type, these attacks will fail. Our attack model does
not require any information from screen display while typing is being done. We only need a
video recording of hand movement and a part of the back of the mobile phone while typing
is being done.

Fig. 3.2.: Work flow of the attack model to decipher the smartphone password.
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The work by Raguram et al. [102] and Backes et al. [18] also shows the text
reconstruction using reflection. In their work, they use state of the art image processing
techniques to reconstruct the text. The fact that they use the information of display of the
text in the reflection makes their work clearly very different from ours.
The attack design by Balzarotti et al. [20] uses a video recording of user’s typing on the
desktop keyboard. The video recording was done in such way that camera directly points to
the keyboard. Balzarotti et al. used a series of computer vision analysis followed by
language modeling techniques to infer the text typed on the desktop keyboard. They use the
information about which keys are not visible in the video while a particular key is being
pressed and puts them as candidate keys to be pressed. Our work is clearly very different to
the work by Balzarotti et al. Our attack is conducted in such way that it does not need the
keyboard of the mobile phone to be visible.
The attack by Maggi et al. [80] uses the video recording while the user is typing on the
smartphone screen. Their attack takes advantage of display feedback mechanism (the
enlarged key display while it is being typed). In their attack set up, the recording was done
while the camera was directly pointing to the smartphone screen. They use a classifier
trained on the appearance of the enlarged display of characters to determine the characters
typed in a stream of video recording. A similar kind of attack has recently been proposed by
Yue et al. [139, 140, 141] on password and text entry process. In their work, they rely on the
video recording of the smartphone screen and fingertip from a distance using advanced
camera-enabled devices such as Google glass. They employ advanced image processing
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techniques to estimate the touched locations on the screen which in turn maps to the actual
key presses.
In all three works by Balzarotti et al. and Maggi et al. and that of Yue et al., the cameras
directly pointed at the keyboard to capture the video of user’s typing, i.e. direct observation
of the appearance of the keyboard or the text typed. In our attack model, we do not use such
a fine-grained information from the screen display. It needs only part of the hand and an
anchor point on the mobile phone to be visible to launch our attack.
We also discuss in brief two side-channel attacks that despite having been evaluated in a
desktop environment [16, 144] help put into context two interesting attributes of our attack.
Using a neural network trained with samples collected from the intended victim, Asonov et
al. [16] showed that acoustic keyboard emanations could be used to retrieve typed text with
close to 80% accuracy. This attack was then later refined by Zhuang et al. [144] who
recovered up to 96% of typed English characters and 90% of random 5-character passwords
(using only letters) in just a few guesses. A notable aspect of the attack refinement by
Zhuang et al. was the elimination of the training process, making the attack applicable to
victims for whom no previous recordings of keyboard emanations are available. In an attack
against the SSH login mechanism, Song et al. [121] showed that the time intervals between
SSH packets provide a significant amount of information on what users type during an SSH
session. Using an attack tool, build based on Hidden Markov Models, Song et al. [121]
showed their attack to reduce the SSH password search space by up to 50 times on average
compared to exhaustive search.
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Like the attack by Zhuang et al.[144], our attack does not require any user specific
training phase, making it applicable to any video on the fly. Meanwhile, compared to the
50× reduction in the search space seen with the SSH attacks, our attack reduces the
password search space by over 99% confirming its lethality relative to some of the known
attacks on text input (see Section 6.5).
There is a series of work which explored the vulnerabilities posed by sensor data on the
mobile phone. Cai et al. [30] and Owusu et al. [96] used the accelerometer sensor data to
infer the password typed on the smartphone screen. Miluzzo et al. [91] and Xu et al. [137]
fused accelerometer readings with those of gyroscope readings while typing was being
done. They also implemented an attack to infer password using the orientation and
movement information extracted from mentioned smartphone sensors to determine the keys
being pressed. A recent work by Simon et al. [117] showed an attack to infer the Pin entered
on the smartphone screen. Attack by Simon et al. uses the output from front camera of the
user’s mobile phone and also output from the microphone. Wang et al. [131] presented an
attack to infer the hand movement of the users’ hand using motion sensors in the mobile
device. Wang et al. show that their attack could accurately infer mm-level distance in more
than 90% of the cases. Their attack utilizes these mm-level hand movement distance to
decipher the users’ pin. Another recent attack was proposed by Tang et al. [128] on the
inference of number Pins by using accelerometer data. Their attack was shown to infer the
users’ pin with 70% and 85% accuracy in 10 attempts in user-independent and
user-dependent environments respectively. Tang et al. claim that their attack could easily be
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used to attack the pattern lock system and requires minimal training with very few samples
in case of user-dependent environments. By using a large number of password entries from
362 volunteer participants and their motion sensors data, Lu et al. [78] show that their attack
could accurately infer the users’ password in first 20 guesses.
Sensors based attack makes an assumption of having access to the user’s smartphone
sensor data [117, 131]. On the other hand, our method is solely based on the user’s hand
movement captured while the user type on their smartphone screen. The whole breed of
sensor attacks is different from our attack model as our attack can be executed in such a way
that does not require any information from user’s smartphone.

3.3 Attack Details
In this section, we introduce the broader idea of the attack model and discuss each step
in detail to decipher the password.
Figure 3.2 shows the workflow and steps of the attack. First, we summarize each step
here and then discuss one by one later in detail.
Step 1 - Capture a video of the user’s hands movements while he/she types the password
on the mobile phones screen. One can easily guess the password typing as the first action by
the user after picking the phone in his/her hands. Our method does not require any
information from mobile phone screen display such as key popups or typed text to be
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recorded. However, our method assumes user’s hand’s movements and part of the back of
the mobile phone are visible on the video clip.
Step 2 - Preprocess the recorded video and keep only the part of the clip of password
entry process. In this process, attacker observes the recorded video frame by frame and cuts
the extra part captured at the start and end of the video and keeps only the password entry
part. This step need not be very precise and the method works even with extra frames both
at the start and end of the video clip. However, less number of extra frames results in less
processing in further steps.
Step 3 - Employ TLD tracking tool [2, 55] to track an anchor hand point and an anchor
point on the visible part of the mobile phone. This step requires the adversary to manually
select the anchor points on the user’s hand and mobile phone. We discuss criteria to select
the anchor points in Section 3.3.3. Having the tracked location of mobile phone-point and
hand-point in each frame, the attack model computes the relative location of hand point with
respect to the mobile phone anchor point.
Step 4 - Given the movement of hand point and some visible part of user’s hand,
estimate the shape and size of the hidden part of the user’s hand. By using approximations
of the measurements, estimate the user’s fingertip movement.
Step 5 - Detect the key touch frames in which fingertip touches the mobile phone screen.
By computing the image velocity corresponding to fingertip point and finding frames with
zero velocity which are part of the sequence of consecutive frames in the video having a
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pattern of ..., P, Z, ..., Z, N, ... in order where P represents positive, Z denotes zero, and N
denotes negative image velocity.
Step 6 - Locate the fingertip in the detected key touch frames. Assuming the last key
touch as OK key1 and given the estimated movement of fingertip and known location of
OK key on keypad, use backtracking to locate the fingertip on the mobile phone keypad.
Step 7 - Determine the keypad state based on the previous key touched and probabilities
computed from a large password dataset.
Step 8 - Build a probability based password model with added information from
determined touched location and keypad state and identify the touched keys. Given the
correct locations of tracked points, we can reduce the search space to an average of 2-3 keys
per touching frame. We discuss the eight steps in detail below.

3.3.1

Step 1 - Capturing Videos

An adversary captures the video of the user typing the password on the mobile phone
screen. With the increasing use of mobile phones in public places such as conference halls,
meeting rooms, shopping malls, airports, and clubs, etc., adversaries get a lot of
opportunities to record a video of the user’s typing. Also, adversaries can get access to the
videos captured by surveillance cameras installed in the public places. One can easily
identify the password typing session from a video clip as the first thing a user will type on
1

Our method will need small geometric modifications for the mobile phones in which password entry process
does not end with touching a specified key like OK key.
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the mobile phone after picking his/her phone is the password if the mobile phone is secured
by one. Our method uses the video clip of password entry process such that the user’s hand
movement and part of the mobile phone are visible. We collected the videos of the users’
password entry process to evaluate the performance of our attack model.
In addition to the video data to evaluate the performance, we used a large password
dataset to build the probability-based model. For the clarity of dataset used, we discuss the
datasets in detail below.

Datasets
We used two different datasets. UNIQPASS v15 Password Dataset [8], a large password
list, to build a probability-based model discussed in Step 7 and Step 8. Another is password
entry video data set for computer vision based analysis and test the overall performance of
our attack model. The detailed description of each dataset follows.
UNIQPASS v15 Password Dataset: From a large password list, UNIQPASS v15, with
over 2 million unique ASCII passwords stored in random order [8], we created two mutually
exclusive sublists of randomly selected passwords of length between 4 to 15 characters.
These two sublists, password list I and password list II, have approximately 0.6 million and
0.1 million passwords respectively.
The passwords in both the lists, Password List I and Password List II, are unique and
chosen randomly without repetition from UNIQPASS v15 selected password list. The
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password length distribution in both the lists is shown in Figure 3.3. The passwords length
of eight characters were most frequently occurring in both of our password list: password
list I, and password list II.
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Fig. 3.3.: Password length distribution in the selected password datasets for training and
testing the attack performance.

Video Dataset: Following approval from our university’s Institutional Review Board
(IRB), we collected two data sets; a training dataset comprising of 20 password entry videos
from 10 volunteers, and a testing dataset comprising of 135 password entry videos from 45
volunteers (i.e., 3 videos per volunteer, with each video recorded using a different camera
configuration). We used three cameras to record the videos — HTC One mobile phone
camera, a Sony Camcorder, and an iPhone 6 plus camera. None of the volunteer participants
were common among training session and testing session of data collection, i.e., the training
data was collected from a separate set of volunteer participants. All participants were
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students, faculty or staff at our university. The volunteers entered passwords on a Samsung
Galaxy S4 phone.
Table 3.1: Specification of the cameras used in our experiments for video recording.
Camera
Configuration
iPhone 6 Plus
Sony
HTC One

Properties
Frame
Rate
240 fps
30 fps
30 fps

Resolution

Zoom

1280 x 720 p
1440 x 1080 p
1920 x 1080 p

Digital
Optical
Digital

Table 3.1 summarizes the specifications of the three video recorders used in our
experiments. We used the various specification of cameras to simulate a range of
adversaries. An iPhone 6 plus camera enabled us to simulate an adversary who uses a
high-end mobile phone camera with fairly good resolution and high frame rate of video
recording. We used digital zoom capability of iPhone 6 plus camera to capture video from a
distance as phone camera was not enabled with an optical zoom feature. A Sony camcorder
illustrated the adversary who uses the video recorder with optical zoom feature and high
resolution. Our last camera of HTC One mobile phone represented basic mobile phone
cameras.
Password entry process and video recording: Users type their password on the mobile
phone several times in a day and can type with no or very low cognitive load. Collecting the
video recordings of the user’s hand movement while they type their real password comes
with a set of security risks. Hence, we worked around this problem by having each user to
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randomly select a password from the password list II and let them practice entering it on our
Samsung Galaxy S4 phones until they felt comfortable typing it. On average, this practice
session took 10-15 trials per password for each user. Following the practice session, each
user then typed the same password during the recorded session. For each of the three
camera configurations, each user typed a password that was preceded by a practice session.
We performed this data collection experiment in various setup. For example, we recorded
some users while they sat and others while they stood. Also, some users came to our lab for
video recording, while others were recorded from inside or outside their residential halls.
The recording was done from a distance of approximately 4-5 meters from the participants.
Video Dataset to Analyze the Effect of Parameters Settings: To analyze the effect of
various parameters settings on our attack model, we recorded 42 videos for each user while
the user typed the randomly selected password from password list II as follows: (1) 15
videos– with three different camera configurations and each camera configuration was used
at five different distances of recording- each at 2 meters, 4 meters, 6 meters, 8 meters, and
10 meters; (2) 12 videos– with three different camera configurations and each camera
configuration was used in four different lighting conditions- 250 lumens, 500 lumens, 750
lumens, and 1000 lumens; (3) 15 videos– with three different camera configurations and
each camera configuration was used from five different angles of recording- each from
-100deg, -50deg, 0deg +50deg, and +100deg. Angle is measured as the angle between the
line of sight of the user’s eye and negative of the direction of view of the recording camera.
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In total, we recorded 210 videos from 5 different users i.e. 42 password entry videos from
each user.

3.3.2

Step 2 - Video preprocessing

Given a video recording of a length of 5 to 10 seconds of the password entry process, we
first cut out the video segment of interest. One can identify the part of password entry in the
video segment, simply by observing the user’s interaction with the mobile phone. We
assume during the interaction with the mobile phone the first thing user types is the
password if their mobile phone is secured by one. We used Windows Movie Maker [3] to
select the password entry segment and cut and remove the unwanted part. The video
segment of interest contains 200-300 milliseconds of recording both before and after the
password entry process. Cutting the unwanted part from video need not be very precise for
our attack to work, precision will just save the unnecessary processing in the later steps of
attack process. We input the selected part of password entry video into AVS Video editor to
extract the frames from the video. The video captured by Sony camcorder and HTC One
mobile phone camera generated an average of 120 frames for each video. On the other hand,
video captured by iPhone camera generated an average of 1000 frames per video.
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3.3.3

Step 3 -Hand and Phone Anchor Points Tracking

We used the Tracking Learning Detection (TLD) framework [55] to track the anchor
points on the user’s hand and on the mobile phone in the captured video. TLD is an open
source tool [2], and has three modules: a tracker which locates an object across the
subsequent frames in the video, a detector which detects the presence of the object in each
subsequent frames and a learner estimates the detectors error and update the template for the
object to minimize the detection error for the subsequent frames.
TLD object tracking tool can detect the appearance of the object in the subsequent
frames even after several failed detections. Also, it works quite well with a real-time stream
of video [2]. We tracked an anchor point on the mobile phone visible throughout the video.
This point can be present anywhere on the mobile phone. Also, we tracked five different
anchor points on the users hand in the video. We selected such an anchor point on the user’s
hand that it fulfills the following criteria— 1). The hand anchor points should be visible
throughout the password entry process in the video. 2). It should be as close to the mobile
phone or the typing finger as possible. We believe that the point which is closer to the typing
finger gives a more plausible representation of fingertip movement. We tracked one point on
the mobile phone as we observed that the mobile phone anchor point is very different from
the rest of the objects in the video and hence tracking algorithm gives very accurate tracking
results for the mobile phone point. Although, we select hand anchor point which seems
different from other objects in the frame, but tracking algorithm gets confused many times
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even with a little bit similar looking other points present on the user’s hand. So, we tracked
multiple points on the hands and merged the results as to minimize the tracking error.

Fig. 3.4.: Flow chart summarizing video preprocessing and hand and phone anchor point
tracking steps.
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Figure 3.4 summarizes the preprocessing and tracking steps. For a given frame, if the
tracking confidence2 was less than a set threshold for more than 10% of the frames, we
selected another point and reran the entire tracking operation for that particular video. We
set a tracking confidence threshold as 0.5 as we found it produces good tracking results in
our sample of the training dataset.
We compute the relative movement of hand point ShandP oint in the frame of reference of
tracked mobile phone point simply by subtracting the pixel locations of hand point from the
pixel locations of mobile phone anchor point obtained from tracking.

3.3.4

Step 4 - Estimating the Fingertip Movement

We observed that the user’s finger first moves towards the screen, rests, and then moves
away from the touch screen while typing any particular key. We also observed that the rest
of the hand also follows the similar behavior of motion (i.e. the direction of motion of other
points on the hand is same as the direction of motion of fingertip. Also, the magnitude of
movement of any other point on the hand is directly proportional to the magnitude of
fingertip movement.). We establish a relation between the movement of the fingertip and the
movement of a visible point. For simplicity, we assume that user will not apply any other
external force (such as force applied over the wrist of the user’s hand) during the typing
process. We build a hand movement model as an approximation of the movements of user’s
2

Tracking framework gives a tracking confidence for each frame in the video as a measure of how accurate the
detection of the object is for the corresponding frame. For details on this, the user is referred to [2].
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hand while they type their password. Given the movement ShandP oint = AA′ of a tracked
point A to A′ on the user’s hand and d, the distance of the hand point A from the fingertip P
(see figure 3.5), then the movement Sf ingertip = P P ′ of fingertip point P corresponding to
hand point movement AA′ can be estimated by applying equal proportion of sides rule3 on
similar triangle △P QP ′ and △AQA′ as follows—

Sf ingertip /ShandP oint = P P ′ /AA′
= P Q/AQ
= L/(L − d)

(3.1)

Where L is the length of hand (length from elbow to fingertip) which can be estimated4
using the visible part of the hand in the video.

3.3.5

Step 5 - Identifying Key Touch Frames

Key touch frames are the frames which represent the finger touching the mobile phone
screen. Using the estimated movement of the fingertip (see Section 3.3.4), we computed the
image velocity5 corresponding to fingertip point [127]. As per well-known notion of typing
process on the mobile phone screen, fingertip moves towards the screen, rests and then
3

In two similar triangles, corresponding sides are all in the same proportion. This rule is also called Thales
theorem or Intercept theorem [95].
4
For an average person, length of the forehand is approximately 1.6 times of the length from wrist to fingertip.
For details the reader is referred to [6, 28].
5
Pixel movement of fingertip point between two consecutive frames in the video segment.
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Fig. 3.5.: Illustrating the transformation of hand point movement to fingertip movement.
Point A shows the tracked point with movement ShandP oint = AA′ between two given
frames. Figure shows the corresponding movement in typing fingertip P as
Sf ingertip = P P ′ .
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(a) Grouping of candidate key touch frames f ∈ Fi , i ∈ [1, 5] to obtain a final set
of key touch frame.

(b) Frames of a user’s recorded video clip. Frame #12, #13, and #14 are
selected as key touch frames in group G1

Fig. 3.6.: Figure 3.6a shows seven different groups of candidate key touch frames. Groups
G2 , and G5 has only three and two candidate frames respectively, hence represent the false
detection of candidate key touch frames. Median of groups G1 , G3 , G4 , G6 , and G7
constitute the set of final key touch frames FkeyT ouch . Figure 3.6b shows the video frames
represented by Frame # in Figure 3.6a.

moves away from the screen [115, 140]. We first looked for the sequences of consecutive
frames in the video having positives, zeros, and negatives image velocity pattern in order.
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Fig. 3.7.: cdf plot of inter key touch frames for training videos captured using variety of
cameras used in our experiments.

Such a sequence represents the corresponding movements of the fingertip to type a key on
the screen. The frames which show zero velocity and are part of selected frames sequence
represent the resting part (or key touch frames) of the process of typing a key. Hence, we
selected and referred the set of such frames as candidate key touch frames Fi .
There can be some error associated in the tracking step or in the estimation of fingertip
movement for an anchor hand point. Hence, to reduce the error in the estimates, we repeated
the whole procedure of inferring candidate key touch frames for five different hand anchor
points. The process gave us five non-mutually exclusive set of candidate key touch frames
(say F1 , F2 , F3 , F4 , and F5 ) each for a hand anchor point (see Section 3.3.3).
To identify the final set of key touch frames, we form groups of all the candidate key
touch frames for the target video. Suppose Fcandidate = {f | f ∈ Fi , i ∈ [1, 5]} is the set of
all candidate key touch frames, then the groups were created for all the frames f ∈ Fcandidate
as follows—
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1. Distance between two farthest frames in any group must be less than the set threshold
T hmax .
2. Distance between two closest frames in two different groups must be greater than the
set threshold T hmin .
Analysis to decide the minimum and maximum threshold is explained under the threshold
selection heading.
In this step, the frames which are the member of set Fcandidate due to error (False
Positive) in preceding steps, will form a group with only a few frames. The rationale behind
this idea is that if a tracked point misses the detection of a key touch frame fi (False
Negatives), it will be detected corresponding to other tracked points. On the other hand, if a
frame fj was detected as key touch frame due to error (False Positives), it will not be there
for other tracked points. Hence, the higher number of frames in a group shows a true
detection (True Positives) of the key touch frame.
Hereafter, we will remove those groups of frames in which the number of frames is less
than a set threshold T hf rames from the set of candidate key touch frames. Also, all the
frames in a group represent one key touch event and hence one frame per group will suffice
to create the set of key touch frames. Hence, we form a new set of key touch frames
FkeyT ouch containing the median of the remaining groups.
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Figure 3.6 shows an example of grouping where set of frames corresponding to five
different tracked hand anchor point are as follows.

F1 = {12, 14, 39, 42, 63, 63, 79, 102, 117, 121},
F2 = {13, 14, 39, 43, 62, 26, 77, 103, 104, 118},
F3 = {12, 13, 40, 61, 65, 102, 104, 119, 120},
F4 = {13, 28, 39, 65, 63, 65, 102, 104},
andF5 = {26, 40, 62, 65, 81, 101, 102, 104, 117, 121}.

Figure 3.6a shows seven different group of candidate key touch frames G1 , ..., G7 where the
median of groups G1 , G3 , G4 , G6 , and G7 represent the final key touch frames i.e.
FkeyT ouch = {13, 40, 63, 102, 119}. Whereas, frames belonging to groups G2 and G5
indicate the error in detection as less than five frames belong to these groups, hence we will
remove all the frames from groups G2 and G5 for further analysis.
Table 3.2: Table summarizing threshold values set by analyzing video training data set for
all three camera configurations.
Camera
Configuration
iPhone 6 Plus
Sony
HTC One

T hmax
150
20
20

Thresholds
T hmin T hf rames
50
30
6
6
6
6
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Table 3.3: Assignment of keys to the mutually non- exclusive clusters for each state of the
keypad. Table shows six clusters Ci′ s of keys for each state Si of the keypad.
Keypad
State
S1
S2
S3
S4

C1
q, w, e, r,
a, s, d
Q, W, E, R,
A, S, D
1, 2, 3, 4,
@, #, $
-

Set of keys belonging to different clusters
C2
C3
C4
C5
r, t, y, u,
u, i, o, p,
shif t, z, x,
c,v, b,
f, g, h
j, k, l
number, space
space
R, T, Y, U, U, I, O, P,
shif t, Z, X,
C,V, B,
F, G, H
J, K, L
number, space
space
4, 5, 6, 7,
7, 8, 9, 0,
shif t,
space
%, &, +, (, )
number
shif t,
space
number

C6
n, m, back,
space, Done
N, M, back,
space, Done
back,
Done
back,
Done

Threshold Selection: We extracted key touch frames manually by observing the videos
frame by frame from the training dataset of 20 videos (see Section 3.3.1). We calculated the
difference between the number of frames between two key touch frames and plotted the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) (see Figure 3.7) of inter-key touch frames for all
three types of camera configurations used in our analysis. Figure 3.7b and Figure 3.7a show
that the distribution of inter-key touch frames for the HTC One phone camera and the Sony
Camera is the same. Note that the average frame rate of video recording in the Sony camera
and the HTC One phone camera was equal. Figure 3.7c shows that for more than 95% of the
consecutive key touch pairs, inter-key touch frames falls between 50 to 150 frames for
videos captured from iPhone 6 plus camera. Similarly, figure 3.7b and 3.7a show that more
than 95% of the key touch pairs, inter-key touch frames falls between 6 to 20 frames for
videos captured from Sony and HTC One phone cameras. We used the above measures to
set T hmin and T hmax corresponding to different camera configuration.
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To set the threshold T hf rames , we performed an empirical analysis of the videos from
our training dataset. For our training dataset T hf rames = 6 for Sony camcorder, and HTC
One Phone camera performed well in detecting true key touch frames. Similarly,
T hf rames = 30 for iPhone camera detected true key touch frames accurately. We noticed
low false positive rate (FPR) and high true positive rate (TPR) for the set threshold values in
our training dataset. Table 3.2 summarizes the threshold values for all three cameras used in
our experiments.

(a) keypad state S1 .

(b) keypad state S2 .

(c) keypad state S3 .

(d) keypad state S4 .

Fig. 3.8.: Samsung Galaxy S4 keypad used for alphanumeric password entry. In Figure
3.8a, state S1 of keypad with alphabets in lowercase.In Figure 3.8c, state S3 of keypad with
numeric keys and a particular set of special characters.In Figure 3.8b, state S2 of keypad
with alphabets in uppercase. In Figure 3.8d, state S4 of keypad with another set of special
characters.
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3.3.6

Step 6 - Estimating the Location of Touch on Mobile Phone Screen

We map the fingertip location to the actual location of the touch on the keypad for each
frame in the list of final key touch frames FkeyT ouch . In the standard keypad, used for
password entry, the proximity between the keys is very high due to which it is very easy to
confuse with neighboring keys locations. Hence, we divided the keypad screen into
non-mutually exclusive clusters of keys as shown in the Table 3.3. The cluster assignment
was done based on the geometrical distance of the keys such that spatially closed keys
belong to the same cluster. For example, the keys Q and W are spatially close to each other
and hence belong to the same cluster. On the other hand, the key A and B are far from each
other on the keypad (we used the standard QW ERT Y keypad for our analysis (see figure
3.8)) and hence will not be part of the same cluster.
The clusters assignments of keys is shown in Table 3.3, exhibiting 6 clusters
corresponding to each of the keypad state S1 , S2 , and S3 of the keypad (see Figure 3.8). For
the keypad state S4 , there are only 3 clusters as the keys in the proximity of rest 3 cluster
locations were not allowed to be used in a password. Figure 3.8 shows four different states
of the keypad where S1 represents default state of the keypad with all the keys in lowercase.
We, now, estimate the location of the fingertip in a key touch frame as one of the key cluster
location. For example, for the video for the password Sec@16, we detect the fingertip
location as C1 and C5 for the first and third key touch frame respectively. Details of
estimating the fingertip location as a key cluster location are as follows.
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Fig. 3.9.: Graphical representation of Algorithm 1 for cluster assignment corresponding to
key touch frames. (Xi ,Yi ) shows the estimated pixel location of fingertip point.
Xf ingerT ipM ovement and Yf ingerT ipM ovement is movement of fingertip for ith frame to last
frame. fn shows the last key touch frame which corresponds to OK key pressed.

Mapping the fingertip location to specific cluster of keys: By this stage of the attack
process, we have a final array of key touch frames FkeyT ouch and relative pixel location (xi ,
yi ) of fingertip corresponding to each key touch frame. FkeyT ouch is the set of frames f1 , f2 ,
..., fn representing n key presses and (x1 , y1 ), (x2 , y2 ), ..., (xn , yn ) be the corresponding
relative pixel location of fingertip point. We utilized these pixel locations to compute the
movement of fingertip from frame fi to frame fj in X and Y direction as —
Xf ingerT ipM ovementij = xi - xj and Yf ingerT ipM ovementij = yi - yj respectively. We computed
the fingertip movement for every pair of key touch frames fi and fn ∈ FkeyT ouch , where fn is
the last frame as shown in Figure 3.9. The reason for computing the fingertip movement for
all the key touch frames with respect to fingertip location in the last key touch frame fn is
the fixed last key touched as OKkey and the known corresponding physical location of
OKkey on the keypad for the password entry process. Hence, fingertip location in the last
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key touch frame serves as a frame of reference for the estimation of movement of the
fingertip for a key touch frame and helps estimate the corresponding key cluster.
We followed the following steps to map the key touch frames to the clusters of
corresponding key location —
1. First step is to calculate the magnification6 . We estimated the width (or length) of the
mobile phone in the video using the visible part of the phone and calculated the ratio
with the actual known width (or length) of the mobile phone keypad.
2. Based on the calculated magnification, we estimate the dimensions of the keypad in
the video. Width and length of mobile phone in the video
wkeypad = magnif ication × actualW idth and
lkeypad = magnif ication × actualLength. We set the threshold T hw and T hl as
wkeypad /3 and lkeypad /2 respectively as we divided the keypad width into 3 clusters and
keypad length into 2 clusters of spatially close keys.
3. Last step is to assign the cluster location to each key touch frame. In this process, we
took the advantage of known phenomenon that the last key pressed while entering the
password is ’OK key’. The user touches the ’OK key’ (Done or Enter) as a last key
in the password entry process. Hence, we assigned the fingertip location in the last
key touch frame as C6 corresponding to ’OK key’ (see Table 3.3). Then, based on the
magnitude of fingertip movement in X and Y direction with respect to fingertip
6

The ratio of the size of an object in the video to its actual size.
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location in last key touch frame, we assigned the corresponding cluster of keys.
Algorithm 1 describes the basic substeps in the cluster location estimation.

ALGORITHM 1: Determining Key Cluster for Each Key Touch Frame.
Input: FkeyT ouch []
Input: Xf ingerT ipM ovement []
Input: Yf ingerT ipM ovement []
Input: T hw
Input: T hl
Input: Clusters[]←[C1 , C2 , C3 ; C4 , C5 , C6 ]
for i ← 1 to Length(FkeyT ouch ) do
if Xf ingerT ipM ovement [i]<T hw then
Clustercol ← 3
else if Xf ingerT ipM ovement [i]<2× T hw then
Clustercol ← 2
else
Clustercol ← 1
end
if Yf ingerT ipM ovement [i]<T hl then
Clusterrow ← 2
else
Clusterrow ← 1
end
Cluster[i] ← Clusters [Clusterrow , Clustercol ]
end

Algorithm 1 compares the fingertip movement in X and Y direction for each key touch
frame with T hw and T hl to decide the key touch location and assigns the corresponding
cluster to the frame. Xf ingerT ipM ovement [i] and
Yf ingerT ipM ovement [i] are the fingertip movement for ith frame with respect to the last key
touch frame in X and Y direction respectively. T hw and T hl are the thresholds computed
based on the estimated length and breadth of keypad in the video. This step finally results in
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cluster location Ci for each key touch frame. We proceed to the next step if the cluster
location inferred for the frame is C4 , otherwise we jump to Step 8 to recognize the actual
key pressed.

Kp

3

Kp1, Kp3

S2

S1
Kp1

Kp

Kp

1

Kp2

Kp2

2

Kp1

S4

S3

3

Kp

Kp1

3

Kp

Fig. 3.10.: Keypad state transition diagram. State S1 , S2 , S3 , and S4 are shown in figure 3.8.

3.3.7

Step 7 - Determining Keypad State

State transition diagram: State of the keypad changes from one state to another state
based on the key touched by the user. For example, if user presses shif t key in the S1 state
of the keypad (see Figure 3.8), state of the keypad changes from state S1 to state S2 . Keypad
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state S1 and state S2 represents the keypad with alphabets in lowercase and uppercase
respectively (see Figure 3.8a and 3.8c). Similarly, state S3 and state S4 represents the keypad
with numbers and special characters respectively (see Figure 3.8b and 3.8d). We define three
types of key touch events and brief description of transition of keypad states as follows—
1. Kp1 represents the key location touched by the user corresponding to shif t key. Kp1
key helps the user to switch between lowercase and uppercase state of keypad while
the keypad is in alphabets states. Also, it switches between numbers and special
characters when the keypad is in number/special-character states.
2. Kp2 represents the key location touched by the user corresponding to number123
key. Kp2 key helps the user to switch between letters and numbers.
3. Kp3 symbolizes any key touched by the user except the key locations corresponding
to Kp1 and Kp2 .

Fig. 3.11.: Probability model graph, based on the top five most probable keys corresponding to each key touch frame. Figure
shows the graph for password entry which needs 9 key presses. Last key pressed is OK key with probability 1. Probability
to be key pressed is shown under the character label for each node in the graph. We generate the passwords from this graph
as to maximize the total weight for the whole password string, given the weight given corresponding to each key label. The
graph is corresponding to password entry video analysis for the typed password Sec@16 and correct key press sequence for
the password entry is shown with gray colored boxes.
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Figure 3.10 shows detailed state transition diagram for password entry keypad used in
our experiments. To decide a particular key touch is Kp1 key or Kp2 key having previously
determined the cluster location as C4 , we compare the previously calculated probabilities
using a generic password dataset Password List I as follows.

P (Keyj = Kp1 ) =(P (Kp1 |P reKey) + P (Kp1 |P reState))/2

P (Keyj = Kp2 ) =(P (Kp2 |P reKey) + P (Kp2 |P reState))/2
P (Keyj = Kp3 ) =(P (Kp3 |P reKey) + P (Kp3 |P reState))/2
Where, P reKey represents the key pressed in the previous frame and P reState denotes
previous state of the keypad before this key-press. P reKey and P reState are distinct
because P reState represents the state of the keypad among the four possible states (See
Figure 3.10) whereas P reKey represents the key touched in the previous state, i.e., in
P reState. The probability of the current key touched being Kpi depends on the previous
key touched and the previous state of the keypad. We say the key Kpi is pressed in j t h key
touch frame if the computed probability P (Keyj =Kpi ) is maximum for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
The keypad state is determined based on the Kpi and previous state based on state transition
diagram shown in Figure 3.10.
For example, to enter password sec18, a user would need to type following key
sequence: s− > e− > c− > Number(Kp2 )− > 1− > 8− > OK. The highlighted key
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entry is corresponding to key cluster C4 . We compute probabilities P (Kpi |P reKey = c)
and P (Kpi |P reState = S1 ) using our training password dataset to determine that the
fourth key touched is Kp1 , Kp2 , orKp3 , . In this example
P (currentKey = Kpi |P reState = S1 ) would account for all the occurrences of Kpi after
any key from keypad state S1 whereas, P (Kpi |P reKey = c) would account for all the
cases where key Kpi is pressed after key c being pressed.

3.3.8

Step 8 - Recognizing Touched Keys

In the last stage of our attack process, we have final key touch frames FkeyT ouch [] and the
corresponding cluster assignment Cluster[] from step 6. All the keys in the cluster Ci for
the determined keypad state are the candidate keys. Hence, there are more than one
candidate key for each key touch frame. For example, for ith key touch frame, if the cluster
assignment is Cj , then all the keys in the cluster Cj have some probability to be actual key
pressed by the user in that particular frame. We calculated the probabilities for each key to
be the actual key touched by user and assigned the weight in the order of probability. We
computed and designed our probability model using the password list I (see Section 3.3.1).
We take very generic case of n keys pressed by the user while entering the password to
describe our model. Suppose, we have an array of key touch frames and an array of cluster
assignment both of size n. Following are the steps, we used further to infer the key pressed
by user.
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1. In the password entry process, last key press is OK key. We assign the probability of
th

the i key touched to be ’OK’ as —

P (Keyi = OK) =


 1,


0,

if i = n

(3.2a)

otherwise.

(3.2b)

and
W (Keyi = OK) =P (Keyi = OK)

(3.3)

2. We calculate the probability pi (Aj ) of a key Aj to be the key touched by the user in
th

the i key touch frame as —

pi (Aj ) = P (Keyk = Aj |Keyk+1 = Aj+1 )

(3.4)

Where Aj ∈ Ci and Keyk denotes the key touched in the k th frame and k is any frame
number. We selected only top five keys in order of probability as the candidate key
th

presses corresponding to the i key touch frame.
3. We build a graph using the top five keys corresponding to each key touch frame.
Figure 3.11 shows a graph for an example password input Sec@16. If a key appears
two or more times in the top five probable keys, we summed up all the probabilities for
that particular key. For example, to compute the total weight for the 3th key press in
the graph shows character W , E, and S with weights 0.49, 0.36, and 0.15 respectively
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shown with the characters in the brackets. The weight for character W is the sum of
the probabilities P (Keyk = W |Keyk+1 = C) and P (Keyk = W |Keyk+1 = V ).
4. For any occurrences of cluster C4 we refer to Step 7 for weight calculations and
determining the keypad state.
For the shown example password entry in Figure 3.11, the first guess will be Swc@16
which shows 83% accuracy of characters guessed in the password. We generated top 5 five
and top 10 guesses in order of total weight of the guessed password. For example next two
guesses for the entered password will be Swc$16 and Swc#16 which shows 67% and 67%
of the accuracy of predicting characters in the password.

3.4 Performance Evaluation

3.4.1

Key Touch Frame Detection

A major step in our attack model is to detect the frames where a key is being touched.
Once we estimate the fingertip movement of the typing hand using the tracked hand point,
we detect the key touch frames. We observed each video manually to label every frame in
the video as ’key touch frame’ or ’no key touch frame’ as our ground truth information. We
compared our ground truth label with that of identified by our key touch frame detection
model. Table 3.4 shows the confusion matrix for detected key touch frames using iPhone 6
Plus camera (best performing camera in our experiments) for video recording. The attack
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model could identify key touch frames correctly in 99.7% cases with a false positive rate of
1.6% and false negative rate of 0.3%.
Table 3.4: Key touch frame detection confusion matrix for video recording using iPhone 6
Plus Camera.
Observed in
the Video
Key Touch Frame
No Key Touch Frame

Identified by Our Model
Key Touch Frame No Key Touch Frame
99.7 %
0.3 %
1.6 %
98.4 %

Table 3.5: Cluster Prediction Confusion Matrix for iPhone 6 Plus Camera.
Actual
Clusters
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6

Predicted Clusters (Expressed as %)
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
96.0 1.4
0.0
0.6 0.0 0.0
0.9 94.0 3.4
0.0 1.7 0.0
0.0
2.2 96.1 0.0 0.4 1.3
2.5
0.0
0.0 96.8 0.7 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0 100 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0 0.0 100

Table 3.6: Cluster Prediction Confusion Matrix for Sony Camcorder.
Actual
Clusters
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6

Predicted Clusters (Expressed as %)
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
92.3 3.1
0.0
4.6
0.0
0.0
2.9 91.0 3.0
0.0
3.1
0.0
0.4
2.4 94.5 0.0
1.0
1.7
3.6
1.4
0.0 93.7 1.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.7 96.0 2.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0 99.0

Shif t Key
N umber Key

Actual
Key Pressed

Predicted Key (Expressed as %)
1st Guess
5 Guesses
10 Guesses
Shif t Key N umber Key Shif t Key N umber Key Shif t Key N umber Key
92.0
8.0
96.0
4.0
98.0
2.0
9.0
91.0
7.0
93.0
1.0
99.0

Table 3.7: Confusion Matrix for prediction of Shif t key and N umber key for iPhone 6 Plus Camera.
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Fig. 3.12.: Plots showing the effect of various parameters settings on the performance of our
attack. Y- axis shows the percent of average number of characters per password correctly
recognized and X axis shows the various parameter settings.

3.4.2

Key Cluster Prediction

Our attack process first estimates the cluster in which the actual key touched belongs.
Hence, it is interesting to observe the accuracy of estimation of the cluster for each key
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press. Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 show the confusion matrix for cluster prediction for iPhone 6
plus camera and Sony camcorder used in our experiments. The prediction accuracies in the
tables are expressed as percentages — e.g., the password entry videos recorded by the
iPhone 6 plus camera show an average accuracy of, 97.15% for key cluster prediction. For
Sony camcorder, we achieved an average accuracy of, 94.42% for key cluster prediction.

3.4.3

Keypad State Determination - Prediction of Shif t and N umber Key

Prediction of Shif t and N umber keys are very critical for our attack process as these
two keys are responsible for the change of the state of the mobile phone keypad. Detail of
the transition of the keypad state is described in detail in Section 3.3.6. Table 3.7 shows the
confusion matrix for the prediction of Shif t and N umber key corresponding to 1 guess, 5
guesses and 10 guesses for the video recording using iPhone 6 plus camera.

3.4.4

Character Prediction Accuracy

Character level accuracy of predicting password gives a consolidated impression of the
strength of our attack model. Using the test dataset of 135 password entry videos, we
achieved an average prediction accuracy of 70.9% of characters per password in 10 guesses
using iPhone 6 plus camera. We were able to accurately predict an average of 68.4% and
66.0% of characters per password in 10 guesses for the videos captured using Sony
camcorder and HTC One phone camera respectively. Table 3.8 shows the percentage of the
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Table 3.8: Accuracy of password prediction expressed as percentage of characters per
password.
Camera
Configuration
iPhone 6 Plus
Sony Camera
HTC One

Accuracy (expressed as %)
1st Guess 5 Guesses 10 Guesses
46.8
62.9
70.9
42.4
58.7
68.4
43.9
55.4
66.0

average number of character predicted per password in one, five, and ten attempts for all
three camera recordings used in our experiments.

Do not
access any sensor
data from user’s device

Considers
random
password

Assumption
about the
structure of
password

Our Attack Model
Do not need any
information of
screen display

Access to various
sensors of user’s
device

Visibility of the
user’s phone screen display

Differentiating Criterion

Other Existing Works
[18, 19, 20, 32, 80, 102, 135, 138, 139, 140, 141]
assume having access to the
screen display of user’s device
[16, 30, 78, 91, 96, 117, 128, 131, 137, 144]
assume having access to the various
sensors in the user’s device such as
accelerometer, microphone, gyroscope, etc.
Balzarotti et al. [20] predict the regular text
and use language modeling.
Our earlier work [115] predict the numeric pin
which is a very simplistic scenario considering
the complexity of keyboard for password entry.
[135, 139, 140, 141] predict regular text and passwords
and use language modeling techniques
with an assumption about the structure of
the text or passwords.

Table 3.9: Comparison of our attack model with Existing works.
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3.4.5

Effect of Various Parameter Settings

Figure 3.12 shows the effect of lighting conditions, recording distance, and angle of
recording on the performance of our attack. Figure 5.3-3.12c show the effect of recording
distance on the performance of our method. Optical zoom capability of the camera was not
used to record the videos. The figure shows the prediction accuracy decreases with the
distance of the camera from the victim. Figure 3.12d-3.12f shows the effect of different
lighting conditions on the performance of our attack. The attack works better in better
lighting. Also, we observed that no significant results were obtained with video recording in
lighting condition less than 250 lumens. Figure 3.12g-3.12i shows the effect of angle of
recording on the performance of our method. We observed that the prediction accuracy was
very low when the videos were recorded from the right-front angle from the user. The
reason behind low accuracy is probably the typing behavior of users in our dataset. The
majority of the users in our dataset typed the passwords using their right hand and hence any
part of the palm of the typing hand was not visible. In such scenarios, method requires
tracking any visible point on the forehand which resulted in a less accurate estimate of
fingertip motion due to a relatively longer distance from the hand anchor point. The attack
works better with video recordings captured from the left-front to center-front from the user.
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3.4.6

Effect of Screen Size of the Victim’s Phone

The results based on the analysis on the videos recorded while the users typed on
Samsung S4 phone which has a smaller screen as compared to Samsung S9+ provides a
more stringent test environment. A brief experimental substantiation is given in Appendix
3.5.
The phones with bigger screen sizes such as Samsung S9+, generally have bigger
keypad size. Larger keypad size provides the flexibility of dividing it into more numbers of
spatially close key clusters and thus provides more information from the video analysis part
of the attack. Each key cluster would contain fewer numbers of keys and thus would result
in a smaller search space for keys touched. The small modification to the attack model for
smartphones with bigger keypad size results in a significantly smaller search space.
For the screen size of the target phone similar to the phone such as Samsung S4, we
performed an extensive analysis to find optimal division of the keypad into key clusters. The
keypad divided into 2 rows and 3 columns i.e. 6 clusters gave the best results in our training
dataset. In other keypad division settings, we observed an increase in the error either for the
typed key identification within the cluster keys or the error for the cluster detection.
We obtained an average increase of 29.6% for the first guess, 16.3% for the first five
guesses, and 17.3 % for the first 10 guesses in the character prediction for the passwords
typed on the Samsung S9+ phone compared to Samsung S4 (see Section 3.5).
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3.4.7

Discussion – Attack Performance

Because the operating conditions of our attack model are very stringent compared to
other existing works, it is hard to compare the performance of our method with them. To
analyze the significance of our attack model, first we present a comparative analysis
showing the difference and level of difficulty of the scenario studied. We, then, calculate the
entropy and information gain and compare the same with random attack. We also present
the analysis and show the reduction of search space in the order of magnitude induced by
our attack model.

1. Comparison of Our Method with Existing Work: We compare our attack model in
various parameters such as operating conditions, unobtrusiveness, and underline
assumptions about the structure of password. Table 3.9 presents the comparative study
of our attack model.

Our Model with Random Guess
within a Key Cluster
iPhone Camera
Our Complete Model
Our Model with Random Guess
within a Key Cluster
Sony Camcorder
Our Complete Model
Random Attack

Attack Model

0.49 (∼ 400%)
0.86 (∼700%)
0.49 (∼400%)
0.87 (∼700%)
-

0.98
0.61
0.99
0.12

0.38 (62%)
-

-

0.37 (61%)

-

Gain
Over Our Model
Over
with Random Guess
Random Attack
within a Key Cluster

0.61

Entropy

Table 3.10: Entropy and information gain induced from our attack model.
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2. Entropy and Information Gain: We estimate the information gain about the
character typed revealed by the captured video clip and compare the same with
random guess. If we select a character c uniformly at random from the character set
Q, and if the attacker does not get any additional information, the entropy of the
probability distribution of the character is –

H0 [c] = −

X

P r[i]log2 P r[i]

i

Where i=p,q, and P r[p] is the probability that the selected character is correct and
P r[q] is the probability that the selected character is not correct. On a standard
keyboard, there are an average of 62 characters including numbers and special
character to be selected as one of the character member of a typed password. Hence
the probability of a randomly selected character being correct is P r[p] = 1/62.
Similarly, there are 61 possibilities which represent the selected character will be
incorrect and so the P r[q] = 61/62.
If the attacker get the video clip and learns the character c ∈ Q0 , where Q0 is the
subset of character set Q, the estimated entropy of the probability distribution of
character is –

H1 [c|(c ∈ Q0 )] = −

X
i

P r[i|c ∈ Q0 ]log2 P r[i|c ∈ Q0 ]
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Where i=p,q, and P r[p|c ∈ Q0 ] is the probability that the selected character is correct
given that character is in subset Q0 and P r[q|c ∈ Q0 ] is the probability that the
selected character is not correct when selected randomly from the subset Q0 . In our
attack model P r[p|c ∈ Q0 ] = 0.97 × 1/6 for iPhone camera. 0.97 is the average
probability to predict key cluster correctly (see Table 3.5) and 1/6 is the probability to
select a character from the selected key cluster. There are an average of 6 keys in a
cluster (see Table 3.3). Similarly, we can calculate the probability for Sony camcorder
using Table 3.6. Average probability to select a cluster correctly is obtained by
averaging the diagonal elements in the cluster prediction confusion matrix Table 3.5
and Table 3.6.
The information gain induced by the learning from the video clip is the difference
between the two entropies i.e.

Inf oGain =H0 [c] − H1 [c|(c ∈ Q0 )]

In a similar fashion we compute the probability of predicting the characters in a
password correctly using our attack model. Table 3.8 shows the average number of
characters predicted correctly in the users’ password using our attack model for
different camera settings. Table 3.10 presents the entropy for a character in the
password in our method and compares the same with the entropy of a character in a
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random guess. Table also presents the information gain per character using our
methods.
3. Comparing Performance with an Exhaustive Search: Our attack model show over
99% reduction in search space compared to an exhaustive search. We evaluated the
performance of our method and found an average of 2-3 candidate keys for each key
press in the password. We show the comparison of search space for a password of an
average length i.e. password of 7-8 characters long [121], chosen randomly from all
letters and number keys. For example, for a password chosen randomly from all
lower-case letter keys, upper-case letter keys, and number keys, an attacker would
need to try 628 /2 candidate passwords on average before he/she finds the correct one.
On the other hand, using our attack model, the attacker would only need to try an
average of 2-3 candidate keys for each character in the password. This results into an
average of < 38 trials of candidate passwords before finding the correct one. It is
evident that our method reduces the search space by over 99% compared to an
exhaustive search. Also note that if an attacker only utilizes the information from the
videos of password typing, he/she can correctly identify the key clusters with an
average accuracy of 97% (see Table 3.5). Since each key cluster consists of an
average of 6 keys, an attacker would need to try an average of 6 candidates keys for
each character in the password. Hence the attacker would need to try an average of 68

73
passwords before finding the correct one that results in over 92% search space
reduction.

3.4.8

Discussion – Assumptions, Limitations, and Mitigations

There are certain users who enter their password differently from the scenario studied in
this work. While our results may not apply to these users, the work exposes a major security
threat faced by many users. Studying the performance of the attack with appropriate
modifications to the algorithm for scenarios such as users entering the password with both
hands and multiple fingers will be part of future work.
The success of the method depends on the following factors:
1. The attack model assumes that the user is using the default keypad for the password
entry process. This makes the design and location of the keypad on the users device to
be easily determined given the make and model of the phone.
2. An attacker could determine the password entry action and get the video of the
process. Password entry process involves a very distinct sequence of actions as a
targets first action would be entering his/her password after picking up the phone if
the device is secured by one.
A potential defense against our attack model is randomization of user-interface which
includes randomization of key locations, the location of the whole keypad, etc. However,
randomization-based solutions need to be studied more for usability analysis. Since
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randomization poses usability challenges and hence the users might not adopt these kinds of
solutions.
Another possible defense against the attacks such as ours is biometric-based
authentication solutions such as fingerprint, face, and behavioral biometrics. However,
biometric solutions are also susceptible to another family of attacks. Behavior-based
continuous authentication mechanisms [64, 66, 99] that verify the users identity throughout
a devices usage period seem to be the most robust solutions against the attacks such as ours.

3.5 Effect of Screen Size of the Victim’s Phone
To study the effect of change in screen size of the phone, we recruited 10 volunteer
participants and recorded a total of 20 password entry videos. Each volunteer selected a
password and typed it two times while we recorded the video of the users typing. The
recorded session was preceded with a practice session where the participant practiced typing
the selected password 10 times. In the recorded session, one for password entry was made
on Samsung Galaxy S4 and other on Samsung Galaxy S9+ phone. A user entered the same
password on both the devices whereas every user choose a different password from our
Password List II. The attack performance was evaluated in various settings of password
entry mobile phone and the division of keypad to key clusters. Table 3.11 shows the attack
performance in four different settings for comparative analysis; (1) Samsung S4 with 6 key
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clusters, (2) Samsung S4 with 12 key clusters, (3) Samsung S9+ with 6 key clusters, and (4)
Samsung S9+ with 12 key clusters.
Table 3.11: Average percentage of characters per password inferred correctly for different
screen sizes of the target phones and attack configuration.
Target Phone and
Attack Configuration
Samsung S4 with
6 Key Clusters
Samsung S4 with
12 Key Clusters
Samsung S9+ with
6 Key Clusters
Samsung S9+ with
12 Key Clusters

Accuracy (expressed as %)
1st Guess 5 Guesses 10 Guesses
42.3

57.8

68.0

38.6

51.5

60.0

46.0

60.4

74.8

54.8

67.2

79.8

Table 3.12: Percentage increase in the attack performance for the character inference with
an increase in the screen size of the victim’s phone.
Change in
Screen Size
6.2 ′′ from 5.0 ′′

Gain in Attack Accuracy (expressed as %)
1st Guess 5 Guesses
10 Guesses
29.6
16.3
17.3

Our results show that the average accuracy of character prediction increases with an
increase in screen size of the target phone (Samsung Galaxy S9+ in our experiments) (See
Table 3.11). We observed the best performance of character inference for the password
entry videos on Samsung S4 phone when we divided the keypad to 6 key clusters (i.e., 2
rows and 3 columns). On the other hand, analysis of the videos of password entry on
Samsung S9+ phone yielded in best accuracy when we divided the keypad to 12 key clusters
(i.e., 4 rows and 3 columns). Table 3.12 shows the gain in the attack performance in terms
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of an average increase in character prediction accuracy with the best performing attack
configurations from Samsung S4 phone (screen size 5.0 ′′ ) to Samsung S9+ phone (screen
size 6.2 ′′ ). In the light of our analysis with Samsung S4 and Samsung S9+ as target phones,
we believe that the attack performance would improve with todays bigger screen phones that
have bigger keypad size.

3.6 Conclusion
We have shown the feasibility of predicting passwords through the analysis of hand
movements in small video clips. We show that an adversary need not have access to the
mobile phone or have the screen of the phone visible to execute an attack. Our attacks can
easily be launched in public places without the knowledge of the victim. Thus our results
expose serious security and vulnerability of smartphone usage in public places in scenarios
such as hiding the screen, while using the phone, that otherwise gives the impression of
being safe to the users. The users have a strong conviction that covering the screen while
entering a password at a public place adequately secures the password against
eavesdropping attacks. Our findings provide an evidence against the notion. We are
currently developing methods such as randomization of shape, size, and location of keys on
the keypad, biometric based continuous authentication system, etc. to address the issues
exposed by this kind of side channel attack. However, these methods still need to be
weighed for other security and privacy risks.
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4. 3D VISION ATTACK ON THE NUMERIC PINS
Recent research shows that video recordings of the user’s hand movement and his or her
smartphone screen display can be used to steal sensitive information such as pins and
passwords. The methods presented in the past assume the victim to be present in a well
illuminated place. In this work, we present a novel attack on the smartphone users’ pins that
does not require a highly illuminated room and works even in the complete darkness. We
use a DS325 Soft Kinect camera to record the users’ interaction with their smartphones
while they type their pins. Using the 900 short RGBD video recording of the pin entry
process from 30 different users, we show our attack was able to break 43% of the pins in the
first attempt and 61% of the pins in the first 10 attempts. With the advancements in the
quality and accessibility of the depth-sensing cameras day by day, we believe our work
exposes a major security risk in the present and future and calls the community to take a
closer look at the security measures for the usage of the smart devices.

4.1 Introduction
Recent research has raised awareness of the security and privacy risks to the smartphone
usage in public places [21, 81, 103, 136]. In the light of known security risks, a smartphone
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Fig. 4.1.: Experimental setup: a user is typing his/ her pin on the smartphone keypad and a
3D video is being captured using the DS325 camera mounted on the laptop.

user would hide the screen or his or her hands if he/ she is typing in a public place or
suspects being video stalked. In order to hide the screen and hand movements, a user
typically either uses some object to obstruct the view or goes to a less illuminated place so
that hands or screen are not visible to an adversary. Many users feel safe if they are using
their smartphone in a place with low light, as they believe that no one can see their hand
movements, and they can hide the screen using some object.
In this work, we show that an adversary can observe a users hand movements while the
user is using the phone in the dark. This work uses a camera enabled with an Infra Red (IR)
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Fig. 4.2.: SweetSpot: Range of DS325 SoftKinect Depth Sensing camera.

sensor to capture the users typing on the smartphone screen and uses hand movement
information to infer the pin typed on the screen. The IR sensor-enabled cameras can capture
RGBD video recording of the users hands even if the user is in dark, and our approach uses
estimation techniques to estimate the part of the hand that is hidden behind the screen. One
might get the illusion of being safe by hiding the screen or going to a darker place while
typing pins or passwords. We take a scenario of the pin entry process and utilize the RGBD
video recording of the users hands movements while they type on the smartphone screen.
Our attack relies solely on the way users hands move, interact with each other, and with the
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devices screen and uses IR technology of RGBD cameras to track spatiotemporal
movements of hand articulations to decipher the touched keys on the screen. Although we
analyze the 3D video recordings of the pin entry process on a smartphone, the attack design
is generic enough to be applied to several other similar scenarios such as a smartwatch,
ATMs, Tablets, etc.
In this work, we used DS325 SoftKinect Depth Sensing Camera [9] to record the users
hands movements. The current version of the camera requires the object of interest to be in
the SweetSpot of the SoftKinect camera range. In general, the SweetSpot varies from 25cm
to 50cm with a depth (distance to the camera), of 72 degrees horizontally, and 58 degrees
vertically. Figure 4.2 show the typical SweetSpot locations in the DS325 camera.
The following are the contributions of the study in this chapter:
1. We design an attack that could decipher the smartphone user’s pin. The attack uses
short video clips of the user’s hands movements and can be launched in low light
conditions or in complete darkness. The attack model does not require any
information from the smartphone screen display in order to be launched. Since
hand-held and wearable devices are emerging with the capability to record 3D videos
(for example, Google Tango), this work has potential to draw attention of security
community to take a closer look at the security measures for smartphone usage.
2. Using a dataset of 900 short video recordings from 30 volunteer participants, we show
our attack could break 67% of pins in the first 10 attempts. The high success rate of
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the attack and accessibility of IR sensor enabled cameras should help raise awareness
of the security threats posed by video-based side channels, even in low light
conditions or in complete darkness.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: we first discuss the related work in
Section 4.2; Section 4.3 discuss the data collection and processing experiments with detailed
descriptions of the attack process. We discuss our analysis and results in Section 6.5. At the
end, we present our conclusions in Section 7.5.

4.2 Related Work
Understanding human hand articulations and their high dimensional movements have
been interesting problems in the computer vision community. Several attempts have already
been made toward developing effective and efficient solutions on monocular, multi-camera
and RGBD inputs [126], [51], [60], [22], [111], [48], [39], [123], [17], [104]. Specifically,
researchers have tried to make vision systems more robust with respect to occlusions [31],
[73], partial evidences [111], [67], [125], rapid movements [98], [119] and model-based
detection and tracking [87], [52], [118] in highly articulated object domain.
The attack by Xu et al. [136], and Raghuram et al. [103] uses the video recordings of the
reflection of the victims smartphone screen to decipher the text being typed on the
smartphone screen. Although they show the attack to work with low resolution video
recordings, they use a machine learning approach and language modeling which, in the case
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of a numeric pin, is not applicable. Also, the attack would fail to work if the victim is using
the device in a room that is not well illuminated. Balzarotti et al. [21] use a highly
constrained RGB video recording of a desktop keyboard from a top view to recover text
typed on the keyboard. A very similar approach was taken by Maggi et al. [81] where they
used RGB video recordings for text reconstructions on a smartphone. All four attack models
assume the access to victims’ smartphone screen displays. Our work does not make any
such constrained assumptions and relies solely on 3D video recording of the victims hands
movements while he/she types on the screen.

4.3 Attack Details
Figure 4.1 shows the experimental setup used in our experiments for 3D video
recording. We invited volunteer participants to our lab and recorded videos of their hand
movements while they typed selected pin on the smartphone screen. Once we get a video
recording of a users hand movements, it goes through preprocessing and then hand point
tracking steps. Tracking results in multiple tracked point locations in each frame which is
used in further steps as raw features. Figure 4.3 summarizes the design overview of
preprocessing and tracking steps in our attack model. We present detailed descriptions of
each such feature in section 4.3.2. We designed a two-layer classification model to detect
the keys being touched. The first classification layer takes all the extracted features for each
frame and classify frames as ’Key Touch Frame’ and ’No Key Touch Frame’. On the other
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Fig. 4.3.: Attack process: a user types the pin on the smartphone keypad, key touch time
information is collected using a key logger application installed in the smartphone, and a
video is recorded using DS325 depth sensing camera. Video then goes through tracking and
preprocessing steps which includes tracking quality check, and consistency in frame rate.
All the features are normalized and mapped to the corresponding class label using timing
information from NumPad application.

hand, a second layer of classification model takes only key touch frames from layer one and
classifies them in 11 different classes each for a digit touched (class zero for digit 0, class
one for digit 1, ..., class nine for digit 9, and class Ok for Ok key touched). We maintain the
sequence of key touched based on the touched frame sequence and combine all classifier
decisions to get the whole pin typed by the user.
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4.3.1

Data Collection and Participants’ Recruitment

Following the approval from our university’s institutional review board (IRB), we
collected two sets of data: a training dataset and a testing data set. Figure 4.1 shows the
experimental setup in our lab to collect the data. A user is sitting in front of a laptop and
types on the mobile phone and a DS325 SoftKinect camera is mounted on the laptop, which
is connected and controlled from the desktop on the opposite side of the user. We recruited
30 participants to collect the data in two phases.
In Phase I of data collection, we asked each participant to select and type a four-digit pin
on the keypad followed by pressing OK key. This process was repeated 20 times, each with
a new pin to be typed. In Phase II, we collected 10 video recordings, each with a new pin for
each participant. Every pin typing session consisted the following steps:

1. Registering the user into the system - Before the pin entry, both hands of the user were
registered in the system. The system extracts basic features of the user’s hands in
order to locate and track the various hand positions during the pin entry process in the
captured video.
2. Selecting a pin - The user selected a pin to be typed during the recording session.
3. Practicing the selected pin - Each recorded pin entry session was preceded by a
practice session in which the user typed the selected pin on the mobile phone multiple
times. This practice session helped the user to get familiar with the selected pin and
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resulted in assumably closer to the natural behavior of the users typing. We did not
video taped the practice pin typing session.
4. Typing the pin - In the final step of each data collection session, the user typed the
selected pin on the mobile phone keypad and a 3D video was recorded using DS325
SoftKinect camera.

4.3.2

Video Tracking and Feature Extraction

UPPER
GRABBER

FINGER TIP POSITIONS

HAND TIP POSITION
Grabbers
LOWER GRABBER

HAND STATUS

FOREARM
POSITION

PALM NORMAL

Fig. 4.4.: Demonstration of various hand points tracking in a video recording in a three
dimensional space. Figure shows an instance of the video frame where multiple hand points
are being tracked using Close Interaction Library (CII).
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We used Close Interaction library provided by SoftKinect for hand tracking in 3D space.
We tracked HandTipPositions, LowerGrabber, UpperGrabbers, CentralGrabber,
PalmNormal, Forearm Position, five different FingerTipPositions (five features), and
measured the Openness for both of the users’ hand for each frame in the recorded video.
Figure 4.4 shows each hand points tracked in the captured 3D video. We measured each
tracked point location in three-dimensional space and we extracted three different features,
each corresponding to x, y, and z direction for each hand. We extracted a total of 62
different features for each frame. Finger Tip Positions track the points labeled as Finger
tips, Hand Tip Position represents hand Tip as a whole, while Forearm Position tracks the
position of forearm. Palm Normal is another point which tracks the position of normal to a
palm with respect to a hand being track.

4.3.3

Feature Preprocessing

Once the features for each video frame were extracted, we used the timing information
collected from the smartphone for each key touched and mapped with the corresponding
video frame captured timing. If the video frame captured timing overlapped with a key
touch timing we assign the class label as ’Key Touch Frame’, and also another class label
for layer two classification as ’Digit pressed in the frame’. For example, if key ’5’ is
touched in a frame we assign ’Key Touch Frame’, and ’Key 5’ as class labels for
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corresponding layer of classifications. This step was necessary for training the classifiers.
We used Phase I data for training the classifiers, whereas Phase II data for verification.
Feature Normalization (Feature Scaling) Features values needed normalization (0-1) as
the different features had different scale. A feature value distribution test was performed to
check if feature values follow Gaussian distribution using K-S normality test. Since the test
showed the values are not following Gaussian distribution, min-max normalization was
performed to normalize the features.

4.3.4

Classification

We build a two-stage classification model; stage one classified the frames in a video into
’Key Touch Frames’, and ’No Key Touch Frames’. We call this stage ’Key-No Key Frame
Classification’. Stage two takes all the frames classified as ’Key Touch Frames’ and further
classifies them into 11 different classes. Hence, a stage two classifier is a 10 class
classification model where each class correspond to a key on a number pad for pin entry. We
call the stage two classifier as ’Touched Key Classification’.

Key-No Key Frame Classification
We trained five different classifiers: Logistic Regression, Neural Network, SVM, kNN,
and Random Forest for two classes as ’Key Touch Frame’ and ’No Key Touch Frame’. The
classification algorithms were trained on the data collected from 30 users in Phase I,
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comprising 600 pin entry videos; 20 videos from each user. We used the rest of 300 videos,
10 videos from each user, for the testing phase of the model to segment key touch frames.
The Key-No Key Frame Classification gave us selected frames classified as Key Touch
Frames which were used further for touched key classification.

Touched Key Classification
In this step again, we trained five different classifiers; Logistic Regression, Neural
Network, SVM, kNN, and Random Forest for 11 classes where each class correspond to the
digit touched in the number pad (i.e. 0,1,2, ..9, and Ok key) in the pin entry process. Also,
the Phase I data was used for training the classifiers. For the testing phase, the selected
frames classified as Key Touch Frames from Key-No Key Frame Classification were used.

4.4 Performance Evaluation

4.4.1

Key-No Key Frame Classification

Our attack model first classified the frames in a video to key touch frames and no-key
touch frames. We first evaluate the performance of Key-No Key classification phase. We
evaluated our key touch frame detection model on 300 videos collected from 30 users i.e. 10
videos per user. The model evaluation data was collected from the volunteer participants in
Phase II. Table 4.1 presents the confusion matrix for Key touched frames and No-Key
touched frame classification. Our model could identify 86% of the key touched frames, with
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3% of the frames identified as key touched frames while no key was touched in the frames.
Although, our model could not recognize 14% of the key touch frames, we believe that the
final prediction of pins being typed were not affected by the unidentified key touch frames
the primary reason being there are multiple frames captured corresponding to each key
touched and, hence, even if the model identifies one or two frames for each key touched, the
final pin prediction accuracy would not be affected.
Table 4.1: Confusion Matrix: Key Touched Frame and No-Key Touched Frame
Classification
Actual
Key Touched Frame
No-Key Touched Frame

4.4.2

Predicted (%age)
Key Touched Frame No-Key Touched Frame
86
14
3
96

Touched Key Classification

The frames that were classified and key touch frames in the stage I classification were
used to evaluate the performance of the classification model to classify a particular key
touched. We evaluated five different classifiers: Random Forest, Logistic Regression,
Support Vector Machine, k- nearest neighbors, and Neural Network. Table 4.2, and 4.3
present the touched key classification confusion matrix corresponding to Random Forest,
and Logistic Regression classifiers respectively, which were the top two performers on our
dataset. To put our results into perspective, Table 4.4 present the frequency of occurrence of
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each digit touched in our dataset. Our model could correctly classify an average of 60% of
frames for corresponding key touched using random forest classifier.
Table 4.2: Random Forest Classifier: Digit Prediction Confusion Matrix
Actual
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
ok

1
70.0
9.6
6.8
8.2
5.0
8.3
2.3
8.9
7.2
8.4
9.1

2
6.0
62.1
5.7
3.7
7.0
10.2
1.4
9.4
9.3
0.0
0.0

3
6.0
3.4
58.0
0.0
5.0
9.2
9.3
6.4
7.9
0.0
0.0

4
2.0
0.0
5.9
60.0
3.0
0.0
6.6
0.0
3.6
0.0
3.7

Predicted (in %age)
5
6
7
4.0
2.0
3.0
6.2
0.0 12.3
3.1
0.0
7.2
0.0
0.0
9.1
50.0 0.0
0.0
0.0 47.7 0.0
1.4
0.0 65.7
4.7
0.0
0.0
7.5
0.0
0.0
5.9
0.0
0.0
5.7
0.0
0.0

8
0.0
5.9
5.9
0.0
9.0
0.0
7.2
51.4
7.8
7.1
0.0

9
0.0
0.0
1.5
2.8
5.0
13.7
1.5
0.0
43.1
0.0
2.5

0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
9.0
0.0
0.0
11.7
0.0
69.3
0.0

ok
7.0
0.5
0.0
16.2
7.0
10.9
4.6
7.5
13.6
9.3
79.0

Table 4.3: Logistic Regression Classifier: Digit Prediction Confusion Matrix
Actual
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
ok

1
60.4
3.1
5.2
5.7
7.2
5.3
3.2
5.1
7.3
4.0
5.6

2
11.4
64.2
6.5
3.3
9.5
7.9
8.4
7.0
6.2
10.0
0.0

3
6.5
1.4
59.9
7.1
4.7
3.8
3.9
3.9
10.2
0.0
3.7

4
6.0
1.2
3.6
57.6
9.3
1.0
10.0
0.0
3.2
0.0
9.1

Predicted (in %age)
5
6
7
1.4
6.1
7.0
7.3
0.0
0.0
9.0
3.5
0.0
5.1
3.1 13.5
59.8 0.0
1.7
7.3 54.9 0.0
5.0
1.9 58.6
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.0
0.0
9.5
5.0
0.0
0.0

8
0.0
5.9
0.0
2.9
5.3
5.4
0.0
65.3
5.1
3.4
0.0

9
0.0
7.1
5.2
0.0
0.0
9.2
9.0
0.0
64.5
9.6
5.7

0
0.0
3.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.0
0.0
66.0
0.0

ok
1.2
6.3
7.1
1.7
2.5
5.2
0.0
12.7
3.5
5.5
70.9
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4.4.3

Overall Pin Prediction

Although we achieved an average of 86% accuracy in identifying the key touch frames,
we combined the actual digit prediction with sequence of frames in a video. We combined
the results for the touched key predicted in sequence in the whole video. Here, we reject the
frames that were showing two different key touches and the frame difference between them
was less than 6 frames. By combining the results, we could correctly predict 43% of the
pins correctly in the very first attempt. In first ten attempts, our attack model could
successfully break 61% of the pins.
Table 4.4: Frequency of occurrence of Digits in our database
Digits
Frequency (%)

1
13

2
5

3
6

4
11

5
9

6
5

7
11

8
4

9
11

0
7

OK
18

4.5 Conclusion
By performing an analysis on 900 short video clips of pin entry process captured
through DS325 SoftKinect depth sensing camera, we show the feasibility of the smartphone
users’ sensitive information leak even when they use the phone in low light conditions or in
complete dark. On the pin entry process typed an HTC One phone keypad, we show, the
attack could correctly infer 61% of the pins using short video recording captured using 3D
camera in the first ten attempts which is alarming. The work exposes a major security risk as
Infra Red sensor enabled cameras are becoming popular and now portable hand held devices
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such as Google Tango are enabled with them. Our work is an attempt to draw attention of
the security community to have a closer look at the security measures for smartphone usage.
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5. EVIDENCE FUSION METHOD TO DECIPHER THE NUMERIC
PINS AND ALPHANUMERIC PASSWORDS
Pin lock is a widely used authentication and identification mechanism on smart devices.
This article presents a video-based evidence fusion attack to steal the smartphone users’ Pin.
The method relies only on the video recording of user’ hand movement while they type their
Pin on the device’s screen. The proposed attack provides three folds advantages compared
to existing attacks on Pin entry: (1) The attack does not require the camera to capture any
content from the screen display. The method employs computer vision algorithm to track
the user’s typing finger and provides an estimate of tapped location on the keypad. The
tapped location on the keypad is translated to the touched key based on the know console
geometry of the phone. (2) The attack assigns a confidence value to the predicted touched
keys as a measure of reliability of the prediction. The tracked fingertip location in a
recorded video is considered as an item of evidence which supports one of the hypothesis
memberships of the touched key classes on the keypad. The distance between the tracked
fingertip location and the center of the key in the video gives us a measure of the degree of
support, i.e., confidence value. Because the number of attempts to unlock a device is limited
to 5-10 guesses before the device gets permanently locked, the assigned confidence value
gives us a method to choose only those predictions which have high confidence and thus
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improving the chance to break the Pin. Our methods to assign confidence measure are
generic enough to be applied to a class of problems where precise boundaries of classes are
hard to estimate. (3) The attack combines the pieces of evidence obtained through multiple
video recordings of the user’s Pin entry. The fusion method of evidences is inspired from
Dempster Shafer Theory. Since the users enter their Pin several times in a day, for example
on a smartphone, an adversary can obtain multiple video recordings of the target.
Using a dataset of 500 videos of Pin entry process collected from 100 volunteer
participants, we demonstrate that our attack could successfully break 72% of the Pins in the
very first guess and 98% of the Pins in the first 10 guesses.

5.1 Introduction
Recent research has shown a large number of successful attacks on a smartphone user’s
sensitive information using video-based side channels [19, 32, 33, 54, 122, 128, 131, 138].
Many of these attacks use a short video clip of the user’s Pin entry process on their device
[102, 115, 135, 137, 140] and often requires an attacker to try multiple guesses in order to
break the user’s Pin successfully. However, the smartphone’s security settings allow a user
to erase his/her private data if one enters wrong Pin (or password) repeatedly. Also, most
smartphones limit the number of attempts to unlock a device to 5-10 attempts before the
device gets permanently locked. This defeats the primary motivation, i.e., information theft
of the attack. To overcome this challenge, we propose a method to assign confidence value
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in the predicted touched keys. Then we take the scenario of Pin entry process and assign the
confidence in the predicted Pin. This provides a method to an attacker to choose and try
only the Pins with high confidence value in order to get the best shot in unlocking the target
device.
We surveyed several video based side channel attacks in the literature to showcase the
utility of confidence assignment in the predicted class. Many of the direct observation
attacks in literature assume the access to the users’ smartphone screen and utilize the state
of the art video processing and image enhancing techniques to reconstruct the text typed on
the screen [102, 135, 140]. Popular defense against such kinds of attacks is to obscure the
attacker’s view of the device’s screen, which can easily be achieved by simply hiding the
input console. We believe that one of the hardest video-based attack scenarios proposed in
the literature is by us [115], where the user’s input screen is not visible to the attacker at all
and hence gives the impression of being safe to the user. The success of the attack in [115]
heavily depend on the user’s hand movement tracking and the estimation of his/her fingertip
location in the video. So we choose the attack model presented in [115] as our baseline
method to apply our confidence assignment and decision fusion scheme and evaluate the
same.
Video-based objects tracking methods estimate the location of the objects based on
pattern matching algorithms trained on the prominent features extracted from the targeted
object [2, 55]. The estimation accuracy of these methods is affected by several factors such
as occlusion, pace of the target object’s movement, noise, and video quality.
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We use an object tracking tool, TLD [2, 55], to track the movements of a user’s finger
(or any visible part of the hand) in the video. In the Pin entry process, the precision required
in the estimate of fingertip location to predict the key being touched is the distance between
two keys on the keypad. Sometimes, there is confusion between two adjacent keys as the
estimated fingertip location is not very close to any of the keys. The assigned confidence
measure is an indicator of the level of conviction in the inferred key. Low confidence value
shows a low level of conviction on the predicted digit and high confidence value shows a
high level of conviction.
Although, our methods are general enough that they can be applied to class of problems
where the decision boundaries are hard to define and we need a measure of confidence in the
predicted class, we show our analysis on the videos of Pin entry process on a smartphone
and infer the user’s Pin and estimate the confidence value in the prediction.
Because the users enter their Pin on their device’s screen several times a day, for
example on their smartphone, if the device is secured by one. This provides an opportunity
for an attacker to get multiple videos recording of a target user’s Pin entry process. This
chapter proposes a method to utilize multiple video clips of the user’s Pin entry and fuse the
predictions obtained from different videos to get a more reliable prediction. In the fusion
method, we first assign confidence to every predicted column and row for each available
video. Then, using the assigned confidence measure, we combine the decision from all
videos to achieve a better inference. Our analysis shows that the fusion method could
achieve an average prediction accuracy of 98% in the first 10 attempts.
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Fig. 5.1.: A user is typing her Pin on the mobile phone screen and an adversary recording
the video of her typing using a mobile phone video recorder.

The following are the contributions of the study:
1. We design a method to assign a confidence value to the inferred touched keys in a
video based side channel attack to steal a user’s Pin. By analyzing the assigned
confidence measure on a large training dataset, the work presents an empirical
prediction confidence threshold to accept or reject a particular inference.
2. As users type their Pin or password on their mobile phone several times in a day, one
can easily capture multiple videos of the user’s typing while they type their Pin or
password. This chapter presents a Dempster Shafer Theory based fusion scheme to
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combine the inferences from multiple video sources to get a better and more accurate
prediction.
3. A rigorous evaluation of the proposed confidence scheme and fusion scheme on a
large dataset of Pins typed by users on an HTC One phone show the successful
inference of the user’s Pin in 72% of the cases compared to 52% of cases using the
method reported in [115] in the very first attempt. The proposed method could
successfully break an average of 98% of the user’s Pin in the first 10 attempts.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First we discuss the baseline method that
we use to evaluate and compare the performance of our method. Section 5.3 introduces the
method. We discuss experimental design to evaluate our method in Section 6.3. Section 7.4
shows the obtained evaluation results. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 5.6.

5.1.1

Baseline Method

We adopt the method reported by us in [115] as baseline method to infer Pin typed by
the user on a smartphone screen. The baseline method consists of an attack on the Pin entry
process on the mobile phone. The attack was shown to work with the video recording of
users’ hand movement while not compromising any information from the mobile phone
screen display. We take the same scenario to analyze the effectiveness of our confidence
assignment scheme and fusion scheme. The experimental setup is shown in the Figure 5.1
where a user is entering his/her Pin on the smartphone screen and an adversary is recording
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the video of the user’s typing using a mobile phone camera. Since the input console of the
user’s device is not visible to the adversary, it gives an illusion of being safe to the user. We
estimate the location of the user’s fingertip in the video of Pin entry process using the
method proposed in [115] and then assign a confidence measure to the inferred column and
row for every predicted digit. If confidence measure is lower than a certain threshold, we
reject the prediction and rerun the whole analysis. As the number of attempts to unlock a
phone is limited to a few guesses, rejecting the inferred digit with low confidence and
finding the more accurate Pin becomes very important before actually entering the inferred
Pin on the phone to unlock. It plays an important role to avoid the phone getting
permanently locked or losing important user data.

5.2 Related Work
Researchers have used advanced video processing techniques (see [20], [135], [102],
[18], [140], [80]) to infer text typed by the user.
Balzarotti et al. [20] used various video processing and language modeling techniques to
infer text typed on the desktop keyboard. Using video recording with direct view of
keyboard and user’s hand, their method identifies the regions which are more likely to be
pressed based on the fingertip positions, which in turn translate to potential keys being
pressed. Balzarotti et al. also applied language modeling techniques to improve the
performance of their method.
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The method by Xu et al. [135] uses a low resolution video recording of the fingertip and
the screen on which typing is being done to decipher the typed text. They show the attack to
work even with video recording of the reflection of the phone screen and user’s hand. The
idea of decoding typed text based on reflections of the typing console is also seen in the
papers by Raguram et al. [102] and Backes et al. [18]. A similar kind of attack recently
been proposed by Yue et al. [140] and Maggi et al. [80].
The works reported in [20], [135], [102], [18], [140], and [80] infer text from a captured
video clip of users typing on a mobile phone as well as on desktop or laptop keyboard. None
of these works, however, use multiple estimates of fingertip location (and so do not fuse);
thus, in our view, these methods suffer from a chance of getting a bad initial estimate. We
use multiple estimates and fuse these estimates, and in addition, we weigh different
estimates based on a confidence measure, thus providing multiple alternatives towards
correct guessing of the user’s Pin.
The works reported in [30], [96], [96], [91], [137], and [117] use sensor data but not
video clips to infer text being typed. They also do not assign confidence to estimates. We
believe that with slight modifications our methods will improve the accuracy reported in
these works.
There is a series of work which explored the typed text reconstruction using the various
sensor data such as accelerometer, gyroscope, microphone, etc. [14, 71, 78, 110]. Cai et al.
[30] and Owusu et al. [96] used the accelerometer sensor data whereas Miluzzo et al. [91]
and Xu et al. [137] fused accelerometer readings with those of gyroscope readings.

101
Inference method by Simon et al. [117] uses output from the front camera of the user’s
mobile phone and also output from the microphone.
Recent research show possibility of exploiting video based side channels to steal the
smart device user’s sensitive information [18, 19, 20, 32, 80, 102, 115, 135, 138, 141].
A very closely related work to this work is our previous work on user’s Pin entry process
on the mobile phones [115]. The attack was shown to work with the video recording of a
user’s hand movement while not compromising any information from the mobile phone
screen display. The attack design in [115] is suitable for numeric Pins, but given the
complexity of keyboard for password or text input, the attack would fail due to the close
proximity of key locations and change of keypad state from characters to numbers and to
special characters. The attack presented in this chapter differs in several ways; (1) we
consider the keypad state transitions in the attack, (2) we estimate the fingertip movement
by using the observed typing hand point location in each frame. This gives us better
estimate of the key touched considering the spatially close keys in an alphanumeric keypad,
(3) the attack presented in this chapter does not rely solely on one point tracked on the
typing hand but rather takes multiple points to track and fuses the tracked results to get a
better estimate of hand movement, and (4) we build a password language model to get a
better prediction in case of lexical patterns in the user’s passwords.
Another closely related work to this work is by Xu et al. [135]. Xu et al. show the text
reconstruction using a low-resolution video recording of the fingertip and the screen on
which typing is being done. They show the video recording captured from a long distance
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such that it was impossible for the user to see the attacker. They show the attack to work
even with the recording of the reflection of the typing finger and phone screen.
The attack by Ye et al. [138] utilizes video recordings of the users’ mobile phone screen
to build an attack on the smartphone pattern lock system. Ye et al. show that their attack
could reconstruct over 95% of the graphical patterns in the first five attempts. The work by
Chen et al. [32] show an automated attack for fast inference of number inputs on the mobile
phone screen using video recordings of the users’ screen while they type. Another recent
attack presented by Balagani et al. [19] on ATM pins uses the video recording of screen or
the projector. The attack by Balagani et al. extracts timing information from consecutive
key presses from the recorded video to infer the key sequence being entered on the keypad.
The attacks presented in [19, 32, 135, 138] were based on the appearance of the screen
while a particular key is being typed. Their attack model uses the information from the
mobile phone screen display which makes our work different to theirs. For users who will
be able to hide their screen while they type, these attacks will fail. Our attack model does
not require any information from screen display while typing is being done. We only need a
video recording of hand movement and a part of the back of the mobile phone while typing
is being done.
The work by Raguram et al. [102] and Backes et al. [18] also shows the text
reconstruction using reflection. In their work, they use state of the art image processing
techniques to reconstruct the text. The fact that they use the information of display of the
text in the reflection makes their work clearly very different from ours.
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The attack design by Balzarotti et al. [20] uses a video recording of user’s typing on the
desktop keyboard. The video recording was done in such way that camera directly points to
the keyboard. Balzarotti et al. used a series of computer vision analysis followed by
language modeling techniques to infer the text typed on the desktop keyboard. They use the
information about which keys are not visible in the video while a particular key is being
pressed and puts them as candidate keys to be pressed. Our work is clearly very different to
the work by Balzarotti et al. Our attack is conducted in such way that it does not need the
keyboard of the mobile phone to be visible.
The attack by Maggi et al. [80] uses the video recording while the user is typing on the
smartphone screen. Their attack takes advantage of display feedback mechanism (the
enlarged key display while it is being typed). In their attack set up, the recording was done
while the camera was directly pointing to the smartphone screen. They use a classifier
trained on the appearance of the enlarged display of characters to determine the characters
typed in a stream of video recording. A similar kind of attack has recently been proposed by
Yue et al. [139, 140, 141] on password and text entry process. In their work, they rely on the
video recording of the smartphone screen and fingertip from a distance using advanced
camera-enabled devices such as Google glass. They employ advanced image processing
techniques to estimate the touched locations on the screen which in turn maps to the actual
key presses.
In all three works by Balzarotti et al. and Maggi et al. and that of Yue et al., the cameras
directly pointed at the keyboard to capture the video of user’s typing, i.e. direct observation
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of the appearance of the keyboard or the text typed. In our attack model, we do not use such
a fine-grained information from the screen display. It needs only part of the hand and an
anchor point on the mobile phone to be visible to launch our attack.
We also discuss in brief two side-channel attacks that despite having been evaluated in a
desktop environment [16, 144] help put into context two interesting attributes of our attack.
Using a neural network trained with samples collected from the intended victim, Asonov et
al. [16] showed that acoustic keyboard emanations could be used to retrieve typed text with
close to 80% accuracy. This attack was then later refined by Zhuang et al. [144] who
recovered up to 96% of typed English characters and 90% of random 5-character passwords
(using only letters) in just a few guesses. A notable aspect of the attack refinement by
Zhuang et al. was the elimination of the training process, making the attack applicable to
victims for whom no previous recordings of keyboard emanations are available. In an attack
against the SSH login mechanism, Song et al. [121] showed that the time intervals between
SSH packets provide a significant amount of information on what users type during an SSH
session. Using an attack tool, build based on Hidden Markov Models, Song et al. [121]
showed their attack to reduce the SSH password search space by up to 50 times on average
compared to exhaustive search.
Like the attack by Zhuang et al.[144], our attack does not require any user specific
training phase, making it applicable to any video on the fly. Meanwhile, compared to the
50× reduction in the search space seen with the SSH attacks, our attack reduces the
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password search space by over 99% confirming its lethality relative to some of the known
attacks on text input.
There is a series of work which explored the vulnerabilities posed by sensor data on the
mobile phone. Cai et al. [30] and Owusu et al. [96] used the accelerometer sensor data to
infer the password typed on the smartphone screen. Miluzzo et al. [91] and Xu et al. [137]
fused accelerometer readings with those of gyroscope readings while typing was being
done. They also implemented an attack to infer password using the orientation and
movement information extracted from mentioned smartphone sensors to determine the keys
being pressed. A recent work by Simon et al. [117] showed an attack to infer the Pin entered
on the smartphone screen. Attack by Simon et al. uses the output from front camera of the
user’s mobile phone and also output from the microphone. Wang et al. [131] presented an
attack to infer the hand movement of the users’ hand using motion sensors in the mobile
device. Wang et al. show that their attack could accurately infer mm-level distance in more
than 90% of the cases. Their attack utilizes these mm-level hand movement distance to
decipher the users’ pin. Another recent attack was proposed by Tang et al. [128] on the
inference of number Pins by using accelerometer data. Their attack was shown to infer the
users’ pin with 70% and 85% accuracy in 10 attempts in user-independent and
user-dependent environments respectively. Tang et al. claim that their attack could easily be
used to attack the pattern lock system and requires minimal training with very few samples
in case of user-dependent environments. By using a large number of password entries from
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362 volunteer participants and their motion sensors data, Lu et al. [78] show that their attack
could accurately infer the users’ password in first 20 guesses.
Sensors based attack makes an assumption of having access to the user’s smartphone
sensor data [117, 131]. On the other hand, our method is solely based on the user’s hand
movement captured while the user type on their smartphone screen. The whole breed of
sensor attacks is different from our attack model as our attack can be executed in such a way
that does not require any information from user’s smartphone.

5.3 Proposed Method

5.3.1

Problem Definition

Let S represent a two-dimensional region which is divided into smaller sub-regions Si,j
where, i = 1, 2, ..., n and j = 1, 2, ..., m. The goal is to identify the sub-region Sp,q where
the object O is located (see Figure 7.1). Once we have identified the subregion, we need
confidence measure in the estimated subregion and the adjacent subregions (assuming the
location estimate is most likely to be misclassified as one of the adjacent subregions). Let
Conf (Rp ) be the prediction confidence in row identification for pth row, and Conf (Cq ) be
the prediction confidence in column identification for q th column.
Now, let there be multiple sources of information (i.e., multiple video recordings)
available; we need a combined decision on the subregion for locating object O using all the
available sources. The method uses Dempster-Shafer theory to fuse the decision of multiple
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Fig. 5.2.: Illustration of part of a frame in a video sequence. Object is shown as O whose
location is estimated as subregion labeled as Key5. Distances dc2 and dr2 are column-wise
and row-wise estimated distances of Object O from center of the block Key5.

sources (see 5.3.2) where column and row confidence are used as basic probability
assignments(BPAs).

5.3.2

Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST)

Dempster-Shafer’s theory of combining evidence is considered as an effective method in
various scenarios of decision fusion. Dempster-Shafer’s theory assumes H to be a finite set
of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses about some problem domain. This set of
hypothesis H is also called the frame of discernment. The method assumes that the belief
induced by the evidence can be portioned and each partition is assigned to a subset of H.
Basic probability assignment (BPA) is defined as a function m from 2H to [0,1], such that–
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m(φ) = 0 and

P

m(A) = 1. Here m(A) is called the BPA value and can be considered as

A∈H

the measure of the belief committed to A.
Dempster’s Rule of Combination: Let m1 and m2 be two BPAs of the same frame of
discernment, induced by two independent sources of information A and B. The combined
BPA is given as:
m(φ) = 0

m(θ) =

5.3.3

P

1−

T

B=θ

A

T

A
P

m1 (A)m2 (B)

B=φ

m1 (A)m2 (B)

(5.1)

θ 6= φ

(5.2)

Confidence Assignment

In this section, we present our method of assigning confidence to each inferred row and
column by taking an example of Pin entry process on mobile phones. Our target object is
the user’s fingertip and we need to estimate its location in each video frame and then assign
confidence to the estimate. In this example scenario, sub-regions are the key blocks on the
mobile keypad, and we can estimate the location of each key block in the video frame from
the known fixed geometry of mobile phone keypad1 .
The method uses TLD [2], an object tracking tool, to track the fingertip location in each
video frame. Let (xi , yi ), i = 1, ..., n be the estimated coordinates of the fingertip of user’s
hand corresponding to n key touch frames for n key presses. Suppose C={C1 , ..., CP } be
1

Geometry of mobile phone keypad is fixed in most brand name phones.
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the set of P columns and R={R1 , ..., RQ } be the set of Q rows on the typing keypad of
dimension Q × P . Center of the columns is represented by x = XCi and center of rows are
represented by y = YRj .
Let (xs , ys ) be the coordinate of the fingertip of the user’s hand for which we need to
determine the column and row confidence in the estimated column and row respectively. In
other words, we need to classify the instance (xs , ys ), where C={C1 , ..., CP } be the set of P
classes for column and R={R1 , ..., RQ } be the set of Q classes for the row. Let (xs , ys ) ∈
Cp , p = 1, ..., P represents the set of P hypotheses and C can be called the frame of
discernment of the problem of deciding among these hypotheses for column classification.
Similarly, let (xs , ys ) ∈ Cq , q = 1, ..., Q represent the set of Q hypotheses and R can be
called the frame of discernment of the problem of deciding among these hypotheses for row
classification.
The linear distance between the fingertip of the user’s hand (xs , ys ) and center of the
column x = XCi in x direction ds,i =|XCi − xs | is the piece of evidence that builds our belief
that (xs , ys ) belongs to column Ci . Also, the linear distance between the fingertip of the
user’s hand (xs , ys ) and center of the row y = YRj in y direction ds,j =|YRj − ys | is the piece
of evidence that builds our belief that (xs , ys ) belongs to row Rj . The closer the fingertip of
the user’s hand to the center x = XCi and y = YRj , the stronger is the belief. However, this
distance measure does not itself provide 100% certainty, i.e., only some part of our belief is
committed to the hypothesis that (xs , ys ) ∈ Ci and (xs , ys ) ∈ Rj . The rest of our belief can
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be assigned to C and R (the whole frame of discernment). This item of evidence can be
represented by a BPA ms :

ms (Ci ) = αi

i = 1, ..., P

ms (C) = 1 −

P
X

αi

(5.3)

(5.4)

i=1

ms (A) = 0
where 0 <

P
P

∀A ∈ 2H \ {C, {C1 }, ..., {CP }}

(5.5)

αi < 1 and 2H represents power set of set C.

i=1

If the (xs , ys ) is far from the line x = XCi (y = YRj in the case of row) then we have
very low belief that (xs , ys ) ∈ Ci and, therefore, αi will take small value. On the contrary,
we will have high belief in the hypothesis that (xs , y s ) ∈ Ci if (xs , y s ) is very close to
x = XCi (y = YRj in the case of row), hence αi will take a bigger value. By replacing rows
Rj in place of columns Ci , we can get the expressions to assign BPAs for rows.
It seems reasonable to postulate that αi is the decreasing function of the distance
measure ds,i . We define,

αi = ψ(ds,i )

(5.6)
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where ψ(ds,i ) is the decreasing function of distance between the sample point (xs , y s ) and
center of the ith column. We also note that the function ψ(ds,i ) should follow the conditions:

ψ(0) = 1

(5.7)

lim ψ(d) = 0

(5.8)

d→∞

As there are infinite number of decreasing functions which satisfy the conditions in
equations 5.7 and 5.8, we define such a function as:

ψ(d) = γe−βd

(5.9)

where β > 0 and 0 < γ < 1. For each digit pressed on the keypad, a BPA can be defined
for each hypothesis (i.e. for each column). Now, in order to make a decision regarding the
column and row touched, we can combine these BPAs using Dempster-Shafer’s rule.

5.4 Experiment Design

5.4.1

Data Collection Experiments

Following approval from our university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB), we
collected two data sets: a training dataset comprising of 30 Pin entry videos from 30
volunteers, and a testing dataset comprising of 500 Pin entry videos from 100 volunteers
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(i.e., 5 videos per volunteer). Each video was recorded using a Sony camcorder at 6X
optical zoom, frame recording rate of 30 fps, at a resolution of 1920 × 1080 p, and from a
distance of 4-5 meters from the volunteers while they entered Pins on an HTC One phone.
All participants were students, faculty or staff at our university. To record the video of the
user’s Pin entry process, we asked each participant to select and set the Pin on the HTC One
phone. Video that recorded the phone unlocking session was preceded by a practice session
in which participants were asked to practice unlocking the phone with the set Pin for around
one minute. We included the practice session before the actual Pin entry to get the
participants familiarize with the set Pin and the phone used in our experiment.

5.4.2

Heuristics for the Assignment of Parameters

We analyzed our method of assigning confidence, presented in Section 5.3.3, on our
training dataset capturing the user’s hand movement in a video while users typed Pins on the
smartphone screen. Before evaluating our method, we need to address the practical issues
related to the implementation of the method such as fixing the parameters in equation (5.9).
To set the value of γ and β, we tested several heuristics on and obtained good results with
γ = 0.9 and β showed the dependence on the magnification, mobile phone dimensions, and
resolution of the video. In our experiments, we determined the β for column (or row) as
β = 2N/r, where N is the number of columns (or rows) in the keypad and r is the
estimated width (or length) of the mobile phone in the video frame. For example, if
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estimated width and length of the keypad are 320 units and 250 units in a 4 × 3 size keypad,
βColumn = 0.0188 and βRow = 0.0320. Table 5.1 demonstrates the observed values of the
phone dimension and the corresponding β values.
Table 5.1: Observed values of phone width and length in the video frames for key-touch
event in an example video and the corresponding estimated value of parameter β for column
and row estimation for example frames.
Key Touch
Frame #
1
2
3
4
5

Width of
Mobile
300
320
350
310
340

Length of
Mobile
200
250
210
240
220

βColumn

βRow

0.0200
0.0188
0.0171
0.0194
0.0176

0.0400
0.0320
0.0381
0.0333
0.0364

Table 5.2: Observed values of phone width and length in each video frame for an example
key-touch event for each key touch frame. YRi is the row-wise distances of the predicted
location of fingertip from the corresponding center of the block. Conf (Ri ) shows the
corresponding confidence assignment for the predicted row.
Frame #
(xs , ys )
Yr 1
Yr 2
Yr 3
Yr 4
Conf (R1 )
Conf (R2 )
Conf (R3 )
Conf (R4 )

1
(570, 220)
225
275
325
375
0.7368
0.0997
0.0134
0.0018

2
(490, 285)
231
293
355
418
0.1598
0.6967
0.0958
0.0127

3
(615, 360)
226
280
332
384
0.0054
0.0427
0.3096
0.3606

4
(705, 280)
230
290
350
410
0.1702
0.6450
0.0874
0.0118

5
(680, 405)
227
282
338
392
0.0014
0.0102
0.0785
0.5607
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Table 5.3: Observed values of phone width and length in an example key-touch event for
each key touch frame. XCi is the column-wise distances of the predicted location of
fingertip from the corresponding center of the block. Conf (Ci ) shows the corresponding
confidence assignment for the predicted column.
Frame #
(xs , ys )
X C1
X C2
X C3
Conf (C1 )
Conf (C2 )
Conf (C3 )

1
(570, 220)
450
550
650
0.0816
0.6032
0.1817

2
(490, 285)
453
560
667
0.4489
0.2414
0.0323

3
(615, 360)
458
574
690
0.0634
0.4464
0.2496

4
(705, 280)
452
555
658
0.0066
0.0490
0.3616

5
(680, 405)
457
570
684
0.0178
0.1298
0.8388
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5.4.3

Basic Probability Assignments

Once we have the parameter β and γ estimated for each key press frame identified in the
video, the method assigns BPA’s for each row and column under consideration in every key
touch frame. The method assigns the confidence measure in the columns and rows as
expressed in equation (5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6). The method then selects the column and row
with highest confidence values for each key-touch frame and predict the digit pressed and
the prediction confidence. For example, if the combination Col#2, Row#2 was assigned
the highest confidence value among possible touched columns and rows, the method show
Digit#52 as the touched key. We consider basic probability assignment value as a measure
of confidence in the respective row, column which in turn translates to confidence in the
digit predicted.

5.4.4

Confidence Assignment: A Worked Out Example

In this chapter, we use the term BPAs and confidence measure interchangeably. We take
an example of Pin entry instance where the user presses Key5 as shown in Figure 7.1. We
show here the stepwise procedure to compute confidence in the column and row prediction:
Step 1) Locate Keypad in the Target Frame: First, we estimate the pixel coordinates of
the keypad in the video frame by using MATLAB figure tool—(300, 300) and (600,700) are
2

The combination of Col#2 and Row#2 represent Digit#5 on the keypad design used in our experiments
(see Figure 7.1).
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the pixel coordinates of the left-upper and right-bottom corner of keypad, respectively
shown as A and B in Figure 7.1.
Step 2) Estimate Center of Columns and Rows: Center of the columns Xc1 = 350,
Xc2 = 450, and Xc3 = 550 as each column is equidistant and therefore center is the line
crossing the particular column from mid parallel to y − dimention. Similarly, center of the
rows Yr1 = 350, Yr2 = 450, Yr3 = 550, and Yr4 = 650.
Step 3) Estimate the User’s Fingertip Location: Now, we estimate the location of
fingertip of the user’s hand using TLD tracking tool and pixel coordinates of fingertip in the
targeted frame are (xs , ys ) ≡ (490, 480). This pixel location clearly falls in the second
column and second row. By looking at the keypad geometry from Figure 7.1, we can clearly
see that Column #2 and Row #2 collectively represent Digit5.
Step 4) Estimate distance of Fingertip from Center of Corresponding Column:
Compute the distance of fingertip location (490, 480) from center of column #2 Xc2 = 450,
which is dc2 = 40 pixels.
Step 5) Estimate distance of Fingertip from Center of Row: Compute the distance of
fingertip location (490, 480) from center of row #2 Xr2 = 450, which is dr2 = 30 pixels.
Step 6) Compute β for Row and Column: β is given as–β = 2N/r, where N is the
number of columns (or rows) in the keypad and r is the estimated width (or length) of the
mobile phone in the video frame. Estimated length and width of the keypad are 400 units
and 300 units and dimension of the keypad is 4 × 3. So, βColumn = 0.02 and βRow = 0.02.
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Step 7) Assign Confidence for Row and Column: Using Equation 5.9, we compute
confidence as Conf (R2 ) = 0.5 and Conf (C2 ) = 0.4 for inferred row and column
respectively. Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 illustrate confidence values for an example Pin entry.
Low confidence shows less reliability in the prediction and high confidence value shows the
high reliability of the prediction. We then reject the prediction with low confidence values
and rerun the whole experiment to get a better estimate of fingertip location with higher
confidence.

5.4.5

Decision Fusion Scheme

We assigned the BPAs for all five videos collected for the same user while entering the
same Pin each time for rows and columns as described in section 5.4.1 through section
5.4.3. Once we have all the BPAs assigned, we combine these BPAs using the Dempster
Rule of combination (see Section 5.3.2), where each video source is considered as an expert
for rows and columns both. We select the row and column with the highest combined BPAs
for each digit as the highest probable prediction. Also, we list multiple predictions for each
digit in the decreasing order of combined BPAs.

5.5 Performance Evaluation
First, we analyzed our training dataset containing 30 Pin entry videos. For each digit, we
inferred the column and row and then computed the prediction confidence (see Section

Error Rate
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Fig. 5.3.: Error trade-off plot for confidence threshold for column prediction. FRR increases
while increasing threshold whereas FAR decreases while increasing threshold. Intersection
shows the confidence threshold value for equal error rate (EER).

5.4.4). Inferred column (and row) for each key press was then compared with actual column
(and row) pressed in the corresponding frame. Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 show the plot of
error rate with the set confidence value threshold for column and row inference respectively.
False Acceptance Rate (FAR) is increasing while increasing confidence value threshold to
accept, and False Reject Rate (FRR) is decreasing while increasing with confidence value
threshold.
We decided to select confidence value threshold as to minimize error where FRR and
FAR become equal (error rate with FRR and FAR value same is called Equal Error Rate
(EER)). We find EER threshold points for both column and row inference based on our
training data analysis and set, T hresholdcol = 0.68 and T hresholdrow = 0.60 for column
and row respectively for further evaluation of our method.

Error Rate
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Error Rate vs Confidence Value Threshold
100
FAR
90
FRR
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Threshold : Confidence

Fig. 5.4.: Error trade-off plot for confidence threshold for row prediction. FRR increases
while increasing threshold whereas FAR decreases while increasing threshold. Intersection
shows the confidence threshold value for equal error rate (EER).
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5.5.1

Row and Column Inference

We evaluated our method on our test dataset of 500 Pin entry videos comprising of 2000
digit typed. For each digit, we first inferred the touched row and selected the prediction if
prediction confidence was higher than set T hresholdrow = 0.60. Similarly, we inferred the
column and selected the prediction if prediction confidence is higher than set
T hresholdcol = 0.68.
Table 5.4 shows the percentage of columns and rows correctly inferred, incorrectly
inferred, and rejected for decision. Our method rejected 21% of columns and 19% of rows
for any decision as the confidence value was lower than the set threshold. We re-ran our
experiment for rejected cases with different parameter values and different tracking points
until we got a decision. Table 5.5 shows the final inference results for row and column
inference. Our method located a user’s fingertip on the keypad and could infer 84% of rows
and 92% of columns correctly.
Table 5.4: Inference result in the first attempt. Percentage of columns and rows for which
inference decision was correct, incorrect, and reject. Reject shows low confidence value
than the set threshold.
Decision
Correct
Incorrect
Reject

Inferred (%)
Row Column
70%
72%
11%
7%
19%
21%
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Table 5.5: Inference after re-running the experiments for rejected cases. Percentage of
columns and rows for which inference decision was correct, incorrect, and reject. Reject
shows low confidence value than the set threshold.
Decision
Correct
Incorrect

Inferred (%)
Row Column
84%
92%
16%
8%

Table 5.6: Comparative analysis of our method with baseline method. Out of 500 Pin entry
videos, table shows percentage of Pins correctly inferred using each method.
Number
of
Guesses
1 Guess
5 Guesses
10 Guesses

Number Of Pins Correctly Inferred (%)
Baseline
Our Method
Our Method
Method with One Video (Fusion of Five Videos)
52
64
72
70
82
94
84
96
98
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5.5.2

Pin Inference

With the goal of inferring the whole Pin typed by the users, we used our method to
locate the users’ fingertips row and column-wise. We selected the column and row inference
which satisfied our threshold criteria described in Section 5.5.1 and deciphered the Pin
typed in the videos. Also, we combined the inference from 5 videos for each user using
Dempster’s Rule of Combination described in Section 5.3.2. Table 5.6 shows the
comparative study of our confidence assignment method using one video, and fusion result
of five videos with baseline method. For each of methods, the table shows the percentage of
Pins correctly inferred in the first attempt, first five attempts, and top ten attempts. We were
able to correctly infer 96% of Pins with one video and 98% of Pins by fusing five videos in
the first ten guesses compared to 84% of Pins using the baseline method.

5.6 Conclusion
We showed that using confidence measure and fusion method, one can guess the user’s
Pin with accuracy as high as 98% in the first 10 guesses. Since obtaining multiple videos is
very easy, as the user types the Pin several times in a day, our results expose serious security
and vulnerability issues of smartphone usage in public places. Our research provides
evidence in support of the need to develop methods to address these vulnerabilities in
addition to technical solutions that may require regulatory actions.
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6. ATTACK ON EEG BASED AUTHENTICATION
Very few studies have explored linkages between physiological, such as EEG and behavioral
patterns, such as wrist movements. These linkages provide us a unique mechanism to
predict one set of patterns from other related patterns. Unlike conventional biometrics,
electroencephalograph (EEG) biometrics are hard to spoof using standard presentation
attack methods, given the intrinsic liveness resulting from the bounded randomness of EEG
signals specific to an individual. In this chapter, we propose a novel attack on the
EEG-based authentication systems by investigating and leveraging the strong correlation
between hand movements and brain signals captured through the motion sensors on a
smartwatch and the wearable EEG headset respectively. Based on this technique, we can
successfully estimate the user’s EEG signals from the stolen hand movements data while the
user was typing on the keyboard. Our attack results on the EEG biometric authentication
system show an increase in the mean Equal Error Rates (EER) of the classifiers by between
180% and 360%. In summary, our pilot study calls for a rethinking of EEG-based
authentication mechanisms from the perspective of unique vulnerabilities, particularly for
multi-modal biometric systems involving a variety of wearable or mobile devices.
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6.1 Introduction
Recent research has explored many new physiological and behavioral biometrics for
authentication purposes, including the electroencephalograph (EEG) and hand movements,
both of which provide viable signals that can be used to verify a user’s identity
[92, 94, 105, 109, 129, 133]. In particular, EEG-based biometrics have been proven in prior
studies to be effective, reliable, and controllable, which possesses unique advantages over
other conventional biometrics, due to its intrinsic liveness indication and cancelable nature
[72, 82, 106]. However, as an emerging biometric approach, the security and vulnerability
of EEG biometrics are largely under-explored and incompletely understood. Given the
unique generation and characteristics of EEG signals, it has been well acknowledged that it
is extremely challenging to impersonate someone in order to spoof EEG biometric
authentication systems using artificially synthesized EEG signals [47, 120].
Towards this aim, we seek to investigate the vulnerability of EEG-based authentication
systems and explore alternative ways to break into the authentication protocol using fake
EEG templates created through the strong correlation between the activities of networks of
neurons within the brain and neuromuscular system [43]. Therefore, the following questions
need to be considered: (1) whether the brain affects (measured through EEG) the hand
movements (measured through accelerometer and gyroscope) during typing? (2) Is there
any correlation between the brain activities and the hand movements? The uniqueness of
our work stems from providing empirical evidence that this relationship exists and can be
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Fig. 6.1.: Attack model: The correlation matrix is created using the EEG signals and hand
typing patterns of the population, based upon which and the genuine typing data of the
victim, the victim’s EEG signals can be predicted and synthesized for breaking the
EEG-based authentication system.

captured through readings of wearable devices such as the NeuroSky headset and the
smartwatch in a meaningful way, as well as demonstrating that the relationship has enough
fidelity to infer one signal from the other. We posit that this work opens up a new class of
attacks on biometrics because of the inherent relationships present in different modalities of
biometrics and the human brain, which is a source of additional biometrics.
Specifically, we present a novel attack on EEG-based authentication systems which
exploits the correlationships between brainwave signals and hand movements. Our attack
requires only the hand movements data of the victims and the correlation model established
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based on a training dataset obtained using a NeuroSky headset for brainwaves and a SONY
smartwatch for hand movements. Figure 6.1 presents the details of our attack model.
Specifically, in practical settings, an attacker can gain access to the publicly available
datasets to establish the correlation model. The attacker can also snoop the hand movements
of the victim through for example installing a malicious application on the user’s
smartwatch or eavesdropping keyboard acoustic emanations [34, 76, 85, 142].
We evaluated the performance of the proposed attack scheme and presented the results
based on data collected from 32 volunteer participants in two separate sessions (as the
training and testing datasets respectively), with the requisite IRB approval. In each session,
each participant was assigned two randomly selected videos from a pool of selected videos.
Participants were asked to first watch the videos for 300 seconds and then type their
responses to various questions regarding the story in the videos. We recorded EEG signals
and hand movements throughout the entire sessions. The pool of videos was built using
some previously selected publicly available YouTube videos.
Inspired by the methods presented in literature [109, 133], we designed an
authentication system based on EEG signals recorded from the users. We performed a
systematic analysis to study the underlining relationship as measured through Pearson
correlation coefficients [25, 37] between the brainwave signals and corresponding hand
movements. Our study showed that a high degree of correlation exists between brainwave
signals and hand movements. Based upon the correlation model computed from a large
population dataset and the hand movements data of a target user to be impersonated, we
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successfully estimated the user’s EEG signals while the user was typing on the keyboard.
We rigorously explored the effects of the attack and our attack results showed an increase in
the mean EER of the classifiers by 180% ∼ 360% 1 . The high mean EER values indicate
that the genuine users begin to see very high False Reject Rates (FRRs), while the impostors
see equally high False Acceptance Rates (FARs).
Our attack presents a potentially lethal security threat and negates the widely held view
that it would be impossible to mimic and replicate brain activities (e.g., EEG readings)
without an access to the EEG device. Our assumption in the attack model is that the
adversary has stolen hand movement patterns and possesses the knowledge of the
correlation matrix among features of hand movement and brain patterns. We posit that this
type of attack can be easily launched as the consumer-grade wearable devices have become
more popular and commonplace, and can easily be compromised by installing a malicious
application [74]. Also, the correlation among features can be obtained from publicly
available resources such as public datasets or studies like ours.
Our work brings forth the following contributions to the field of physiological and
behavioral biometrics authentication:
1. We presented the empirical evidences of the relationship between physiological
biometrics stemming from human brain (EEG) and behavioral biometrics stemming
from hand movements. Our findings open up a new mode of attacks on biometric
1

Figure 6.6(e) shows the increase in mean EER from 0.026 to 0.094 with θ = 0.20 and to 0.096 with θ =
0.23 i.e., an increase of ≈ 355% and ≈ 363% respectively in the mean EER while using LDA-based EEG
authentication system.
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systems through exploring the intrinsic neurological or neuromuscular links among
various body components.
2. We proposed a novel attack on EEG-based authentication systems by taking
advantage of the correlation among the hand movements and brainwave signals to
generate fake EEG signals. Our work exposes a major threat on EEG-based
authentication mechanisms. An adversary who gains access to the user’s hand
movement patterns 2 and possesses the knowledge of correlation among the hand
movements and the brainwave signals 3 , poses a serious security threat.
3. We performed a systematic analysis of features from EEG signals and corresponding
hand movements. We recorded the brainwave patterns (using a NeuroSky headset)
and the hand movement patterns (using a SONY smartwatch) from 32 users while the
users was watching a given video and typing on the keyboard. Feature analysis and
study of any inter-relation among the users’ hand movements and brainwave signals
show a strong correlation between the two biometric modalities.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents the detailed attack
model. The design of the experiments with data collection and analysis are described in
Section 6.3. Section 6.4 details the feature analysis including correlation between hands
movements and brainwave signals. We show our attack results in Section 6.5. Section 6.6
2

An adversary can steal a targeted user’s hand movements by sending or installing a malicious application on
the user’s smart watch device (see [74]).
3
The knowledge of correlation can be obtained using the publicly available datasets or from the studies such as
ours.
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discusses the related work. Finally, we draw our conclusions and discuss future directions
for the research in Section 6.10.
ALGORITHM 2: Attack Model on EEG Based Authentication System.
Input: EEG features, A, Smart watch features S, Threshold θ.
Output: Mimicked EEG features Amimic
Construct pairwise correlation matrix rAS using A and S.
Select AC and S C using eq. 6.1.
Estimate EEG features ACest based on linear regression model in eq. 6.2.
Generate the mimicked EEG features Amimic using ACest and ADummy .

6.2 Attack Model
This section presents the attack model on the EEG-based authentication systems. The
attack utilizes the knowledge of correlationships between the users’ hand movements and
their brainwave activities. Given a user’s hand movements data, our attack model can
successfully decipher the corresponding brainwave signals using the correlation model
between the two signals previously learned from a population data. Figure 6.1 shows the
work flow of our attack model. Genuine user’s hand movements and brainwave signals were
recorded using a smartwatch and a NeuroSky headset respectively. The attacker possesses
the knowledge of correlation between the two signals and steals the victim’s hand
movements patterns while he/she types on the keyboard. The adversary, then, utilizes the
previously leaned correlations and stolen hand movements patterns to generate the victim’s
brainwave patterns (i.e., EEG signals). These generated EEG signals are used to get access
to the user’s device which is secured through the user’s EEG signals.
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Our attack model is easy to launch as it only requires the user’s hand movements
patterns to attack the target authentication systems. As shown in many prior studies
[46, 77, 97, 132], Bluetooth or WiFi-enabled wearable devices (e.g., smartwatches and
wristbands) have become the targets of attacks and various personal private information
(e.g., motion data) has suffered from the increasing risks of leakage and disclosure. In this
study, it is assumed that the attacker can gain the access to the legitimate user’s hand
movement patterns by compromising the user’s wearable devices. For instance, this could
be done by sending or installing a malicious application in the user’s device.
Let the features of hand movement patterns collected from a smartwatch be
S = {S1 , S2 , . . . Sm } and the brain activity patterns collected from an wearable EEG device
(in our case the NeuroSky headset) be A = {A1 , A2 , . . . , An } where Sj and Ai are the jth
and ith feature of S and A respectively. Both Sj and Ai are time series data. Let rAS be the
correlation matrix between A and S. The correlated subset of AC and S C are shown in Eq.
6.1, where θ is a user defined parameter.

AC ⊂ A | rAS > θ, S C ⊂ S | rAS > θ

(6.1)

Let Amimic be a feature set of brain activities. The adversary estimates Amimic by,
Amimic = F(S C ). We propose a way of representing F (.) using an equation of linear
pop
C
regression with standardized data variables [57] as described by, ACest
std = rAC S C ∗ Sstd . The

correlation coefficient between the correlated features of brain activities and hand
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pop
Cest
and
movements patterns from the population is rA
C S C . The standardized variables Astd
C
Sstd
are defined as [57]:

ACest
std =

S Cattc − S̄ Cattc
ACest − ĀCpop
Cattc
=
;
S
std
σ pop
σ attc

(6.2)

The attacker estimates ACest using stolen hand movement features S Cattc of a legitimate
user. S̄ Cattc and σ Cattc are the mean and standard deviation of hand movement patterns of
the attacker respectively. Threat model uses the population mean, ĀCpop and the standard
deviation of brain activity patterns σ pop to standardize ACest . Threat model thus estimates
and synthesizes the counterfeit features of brain activities using Eq. 6.3:

pop
pop
∗
ACest = {rA
C SC ∗ σ

S Cattc − S̄ Cattc
} + ĀCpop
attc
σ

(6.3)

Generally, it was observed that |AC | ⊂ |A|. So, we filled the empty feature positions
ADummy , with the randomly selected, least correlated features from any of the users
excluding the user who was currently selected for the attack. Finally, the fake EEG feature
data is generated by Amimic = {ACest ∪ ADummy } to attack the target authentication system.
The detailed procedure of the attack model is described in Algorithm 2.
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Video

Start session: Placing NeuroSky on
the head and smart watch on the hand
Action
Devices
Sensors
Smart Watch

Video1

Watch
(300 Seconds)

NeuroSky
Smart Watch

Respond
(300 Seconds)

NeuroSky

Accelerometer,
Gyroscope
EEG
Accelerometer,
Gyroscope
EEG

Rest (60 Seconds)
Smart Watch
Video2

Watch
(300 Seconds)

NeuroSky
Smart Watch

Respond
(300 Seconds)

(a) Android App collecting synchronized
data from NeuroSky and smartwatch via
Bluetooth.

NeuroSky

Accelerometer,
Gyroscope
EEG
Accelerometer,
Gyroscope
EEG

End session: Removing NeuroSky from
the head and smart watch from the hand.

(b) List of activities performed by the participants
in two sessions.

Fig. 6.2.: Data collection framework and activities performed by participants.
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Fig. 6.3.: Experimental protocols: EEG signals were collected using a NeuroSky headset
whereas typing patterns were recorded using the accelerometer and gyroscope readings
through a smartwatch. Pre-processing module cleaned up and then synchronized the
acquired sensory data. The subsequent module generated feature vectors for training an
EEG-based authentication system as well as for correlation analysis between the hand
movements and EEG signals.

6.3 Experimental Setup
In this section, we present the data collection framework (see Section 6.3.1) and the data
analysis and feature extraction framework (see Section 6.3.2). Section 6.3.3 describes the
target authentication system design.

6.3.1

Data Collection Protocols

With the approval of our university’s institutional review board (IRB), we recruited 32
volunteer participants and obtained the informed written consent from all participants for
using the collected data for this specific research. Each participant provided data in two
different sessions: a training session and a testing session. Every participant was instructed
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to perform four different types of activities, each 300 seconds long, in each session (see Fig.
6.2 (b) for details).
We selected a pool of 18 videos from a video networking website (see Appendix 6.7 for
the list of selected videos) and randomly assigned four different videos from the pool of
videos to each participant in our study; two videos for the training session, and the rest two
videos for the testing session. There was a gap of at least 6 hours between the two sessions.
The participant wore a SONY smartwatch on his/her wrist and a NeuroSky headset during
the whole session. Each session was divided into four different types of activities (see Fig.
6.2 (b)):
1. Watch the First Video (Video I) —The participant watched the first assigned video on
the computer screen for 300 seconds. The rest of the video was discarded.
2. Type on the Keyboard (Video I) — The participant typed his/her responses to the
previously designed questions about the story played in the video. The typing activity
was restricted for 300 seconds.
3. Watch the Second Video (Video II) — The participant watched the second assigned
video on the computer screen for 300 seconds. The rest of the video was discarded.
4. Type on the Keyboard (Video II) — The participant typed his/her responses to the
previously designed questions about the story played in the video.
There was a rest period of 60 seconds between any two consecutive activities. We
recorded the participants’ hand movements through the motion sensors (i.e., accelerometer
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and gyroscope) available within the smartwatch, and the brainwave activities through the
NeuroSky headset. We developed an Android application on a smartphone paired with both
the smartwatch and the headset, to record these signals in a time synchronized manner. The
Android application’s user interface and data collection framework are shown in Figure 6.2
(a). The sampling rates of the NeuroSky headset was 512 Hz, and the accelerometer and
gyroscope was 80 Hz, respectively. To avoid the loss of data due to interrupts in the
smartwatch and the smartphone, we buffered the data of 5 seconds in the smartwatch using
Android Wear and then transferred them to the smartphone.
For each session the SONY smartwatch and the NeuroSky headset were reset and paired
appropriately. Each session was prepared and started with a practice session (no less than
one minute) to help the participants get familiar with the experimental procedures and
devices. The data collection was commenced when the participants felt comfortable with all
the experimental settings.
The questions in the typing exercises were general and repeated for all the videos: 1)
how do you feel about the video? 2) what type of emotion are you getting after watching
this video? 3) can you give a summary of the video content?

6.3.2

Data Pre-processing and Feature Extraction

The pre-processing is performed in the following three steps for both the NeuroSky and
smartwatch data.
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Table 6.1: Description of 32 and 28 features extracted from accelerometer and gyroscope
respectively.
Smart Watch
Feature # Accelerometer (32 features) Feature # Gyroscope (28 features)
For each signal in Sacx − Sacm
For each signal in Sgyx − Sgym
37-40
Average Peak Interval
69-72
Average Peak Interval
41-44
Signal Band Power
73-76
Signal Band Power
45-48
Signal Energy
77-80
Signal Energy
49-52
Median of the magnitude
81-84
Median of the magnitude
53-56
# of signal peak
85-88
Range of signal amplitude
57-60
Range of signal amplitude
89-92
Median frequency
61-64
Median frequency that divides a power spectrum into
two regions with equal amplitude
65-68
Spectral entropy
93-96
Spectral entropy

1. First, we checked the error values in the NeuroSky data. NeuroSky provides the signal
quality parameter while sending the data to the smartphone. If the signal quality
attribute values is 0, then it is good and the data item is accepted as valid. A higher
signal quality value indicates a less trustable and lower quality signal recording.
Signal quality parameter ranges from 0 to 250. In our experiments, we set a threshold
as 200 for the signal quality values. That is, if the recorded signal quality value is
more than 200, we discarded the corresponding EEG data item as invalid.
2. In the second step, the smartwatch data was checked for missing values. We ran
scripts on each user’s data to check for missing values based on the time stamp
information and the designated sampling rate. If the missing values were less than 20
samples, we took the average of values before and after the missing samples. We
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discarded the data which had more than 20 missing samples and repeated the data
collection for that user.
3. Finally, the sensory data from the NeuroSky headset and the SONY smartwatch
motion sensors (accelerometer and gyroscope) was checked for synchronization errors
using the time stamps of the smartphone, smartwatch and headset. The synchronized
data was stored for the following feature extraction and analysis phase.

Feature Extraction of EEG Data
We used the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) to analyze the EEG data [124] (please
refer to Appendix 6.8 for details about DWT). We chose the number of decomposition
levels to be 10 for our analysis. Therefore, the EEG signals were decomposed into details
H1 − H10 and one final approximation, L10. Prior literature [124] suggested that the
smoothing feature of the Daubechies wavelet of order 4 (db4) makes it more appropriate to
detect changes of EEG signals. So, we adopted the same strategy in our processing and
analysis. The extracted wavelet coefficients provide a compact representation of energy
distribution of the signals in time and frequency.
To reduce the dimensionality of the extracted feature vectors, the statistical features
were used to represent the time-frequency distribution of EEG signals [56]. We extracted
features from H3 − H10, and L10 sub-bands. The following features were calculated for
each sub-band; (1) mean of the absolute values, (2) average power, and (3) standard
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deviation (Features #1-#27 i.e., a total of 27 features from 9 sub-bands). We also calculated:
(4) the ratio of absolute mean values for adjacent bands (Features #28-#35, i.e., a total of 8
features from 9 adjacent sub-bands).
The distribution of the signals in the frequency domain was captured by means of the
absolute values and the average power computed for each sub-band. The standard deviation
and the ratio of absolute mean values captured the amount of change in frequency
distribution of the signals. The 36th feature represents the spectral entropy of the signals
[53].

Feature Extraction of Motion Data
The accelerometer and gyroscope sensors provide X-axis, Y-axis and Z-axis motion
values. For the accelerometer, each component of the acceleration is defined as Sacx , Sacy ,
Sacz , and each component of the rotation is defined as Sgyx , Sgyy , Sgyz . Using these values
we generated the magnitude of acceleration as Sacm and the magnitude of rotation Sgym .
Sacm and Sgym as expressed in the Eq 6.4:

Sacm =

q
2 + S2 + S2
Sac
acy
acz
x

Sgym =

q
2 + S2 + S2
Sgy
gyy
gyz
x

and

(6.4)
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By using four components (3-axes and magnitude) of the accelerator and gyroscope
data, we extracted 60 different features [63] as described in Table 6.1.

6.3.3

Target Authentication System Prototype

Using the 36 features extracted from EEG data, we trained an authentication classifier
framework (as shown in Figure 6.3). The labeled training sessions’ data of all the users were
given as the inputs to the training module, while the labeled testing sessions’ data from all
the users were given as the inputs to the testing module. The framework calculated the
accuracy and EER (Equal Error Rate) values. The mean EER values for 32 subjects using
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), Random Forest (RF), Neural Network (NN), and
Support Vector Machine (SVM) respectively are shown in the Figure 6.6(e). We obtained an
average EER of 3.6% using the LDA classifier, and an average EER of 3% using the NN
classifier, which represent the best performance achieved on our test data.
Another factor we are interested in investigating is the effects of variations of the time
window sizes on the proposed EEG-based authentication system. We divided the entire data
from 32 subjects into various sizes of time windows and performed authentication tests
based on these varying time windows. Here, T1 seconds time window means that we used
fist T1 seconds of all 8 activities’ data (4 for training and the rest 4 for testing) and studied
how the authentication system performed during this period of time. Likewise for T2
seconds, we used the first T2 seconds time of all activities. The performance (i.e., the mean
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Mean EER value of 32 subjects

0.14

y = LDA

y = RF

y = NNet

y = SVM

0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Time length (seconds) of data used

Fig. 6.4.: Performance (Mean EER value of 32 users) of the EEG-based authentication
system during different time lengths of activities using four classifiers.

EER value of 32 users) using the data with varying time windows on LDA, RF, NN and
SVM classifiers are shown in Figure 6.4. It is observed that, the mean EER values with
LDA, RF and NN classifiers are quite low and the classifier model performs well to
authenticate users based on their EEG brainwave signals.

6.4 Correlation Analysis Details
Next, we seek to explore the relationships between human typing patterns and brainwave
activities. We have computed the correlations [24, 37] between the extracted features of
EEG headset and smartwatch data. We plotted the HeatMaps of these values in Figure 6.5
(c). The HeatMaps of the correlation coefficients computed among the brain activities and
hand typing patterns features are also shown in Figures 6.5 (a) and (b) respectively. It is
observed from Figure 6.5 (b) that a rather high level of correlationship exists among the
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Fig. 6.5.: HeatMap of the correlation coefficients computed among the extracted features of
(a) single-channel EEG signal from the headset, (b) accelerometer and gyroscope sensors of
the smartwatch, (c) between all features of the two devices, and (d) the correlation
coefficient between the feature pairs extracted from NeuroSky and smartwatch above a
threshold value θ = 0.23.

features of hand motion data. This is obvious given the fact that these motion sensors
basically record the hand movements of the subjects. It is also observed from Figure 6.5 (a)
that there is a high degree of correlationship among the features of EEG brainwave data.
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This is due to the existence of correlations among the features extracted from the different
sub-bands of EEG data using DWT.
More interestingly, it is found that a significant level of correlation exists among the
features of the EEG data and the accelerometer/gyroscope data. This observation can be
seen in the upper left half of Figure 6.5 (c). The exact values between some features of the
cross platforms are listed in Figure 6.5 (d).

6.5 Attack Results
In this section, we would like to evaluate the performance of the proposed attack
approach on the EEG-based authentication system, leveraging the underlying
correlationship between the hand movements and EEG brainwaves. We used the generated
fake EEG data (see Section 6.2) to attack the legitimate users in the designed target
authentication system. To this aim, we first trained the model with the training session’s data
of a legitimate user. For testing, we considered that the attacker had access to the legitimate
user’s hand movements data which is S attc . The attacker’s brain activity data was
synthesized and mimicked using Algorithm 2. So, a fake user profile, U f aked was created by
merging these two sets of features i.e. U f aked = {Amimic ∪ S attc } which was used for attack.
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(a) User-wise attack performance for LDA-based system.
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(b) User-wise attack performance for RF-based system.
Neural Network (NNet)
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(c) User-wise attack performance for NN-based system.
Support Vector Machine (SVM)
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(d) User-wise attack performance for SVM-based system.
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(e) Classifiers-wise mean EER computed over all users.

Fig. 6.6.: Mean EER values before and after user-specific attack for (a) LDA, (b) RF, (c)
NNet, and (d) SVM. Figure 6.6(e) shows the mean EER before and after attack computed
over all users. Attack performance is shown with varying threshold θ= 0.20 (green), and
threshold θ = 0.23 (yellow).
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Mean EER Values using different time length of data with classifiers
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Fig. 6.7.: Performances of the proposed attack model using different time window length of
all activities with LDA, RF, NN and SVM verifiers [θ = 0.23].

6.5.1

Attack Performance for Each User

We repeated this experiment for each user in our study with varying values of θ as 0.20
and 0.23. Figures 6.6 shows the attack performance on each user in our study for four
different classification algorithms used to build the EEG-based authentication systems.
Figure 6.6(e) shows the overall mean EER values computed for all the users in our study. It
is observed from Figure 6.6(e) that there are significant increases in EER values with attack.
This observation is valid for different θ values and for all classifiers.

6.5.2

Attack Performance for Decision Time

We then analyzed the effects of the variations of time window lengths of activities on the
proposed attack model. We divided the time segments with the same procedure as we did in
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Fig. 6.8.: Mean EER values before and after the attack for (a) LDA, (b) RF, (c) NN, and (d)
SVM classifier based systems with time difference between user registration and attack.
Attack performance is shown with varying thresholds: θ= 0.20 (green) and θ = 0.23
(yellow).

case of testing the authentication model. The result is presented in Figure 6.7, where the
subscript after represents the values with the proposed snoop-forge-replay attack. The mean
EER value increases by 4% with LDA, 3% with RF, 6% with NN, and 14% with SVM
classifies based upon the generated attack data. It can be observed that the ’Attack’ cases
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Fig. 6.9.: Mean EER values before and after the attack for (a) LDA, (b) RF, (c) NN, and (d)
SVM classifier based systems for Male and Female participants. Attack performance is
shown with varying thresholds θ= 0.20 (green) and θ = 0.23 (yellow). EER of the system
before the attack is shown with blue color.

have higher mean EER values than the cases when the attack was not deployed (subscript
before) in all the time segments with all classifiers.

147
6.5.3

Attack Performance for Time Interval between User Registration and Attack

We further analyzed the effects of variations of time intervals between registering the
user into the system and launching the proposed attack. To this aim, we performed the
attack on the users with three different time interval windows between the user registration
and attack; (1) less than 3 days, (2) more than 3 days but less than 7 days, and (3) more than
7 days but less than 11 days. We collected the genuine users’ samples on the day when the
attack was launched and compared the performance of the attack against the genuine user
authentication performance. As shown in Figure 6.8, it is observed that the ’Attack’ cases
(green with θ = 0.20 and yellow with θ = 0.23) have higher mean EER values than the
cases when the attack was not deployed (blue).

6.5.4

Attack Performance with User’s Gender

We also analyzed the effects of the users’ gender on the performance of the attack. As
shown in Figure 6.9, our results show that the attack was generally successful for both
female and male subjects, and the ’Attack’ cases (green with θ = 0.20 and yellow with
θ = 0.23) have higher mean EER values than the cases when the attack was not deployed
(blue). There was an exception in case of female users with RF-based EEG authentication
system. We believe that this behavior could be an outlier, given the fact that we have a
relatively small number of female subjects (i.e., 6 female and 26 male) in our dataset.
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6.6 Related Work
Recently, researchers have independently proposed authentication and attack models
using wearable devices. We discuss them by categorizing into four sections (1)
authentication using EEG signals, (2) attack models using EEG, (3) authentication using
smartwatches, and (4) attacks using smartwatches.
1. Authentication system using EEG signals: Researchers have been working to
authenticate users using EEG signals while they perform certain tasks [59, 61, 100]. In
[108], the authors used Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS) as an authentication
modality. The paper showed EERs of 0.036 and 0.046 with best channel configuration using
Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Naive Bayes (NB) classifiers respectively. The paper
used data recorded from 50 users while the participants perform simple arithmetic tasks on
computer. In another work [15], the authors used a low cost 14 electrode EMOTIV EPOC
device. The participants were asked to perform three mental imaginary activities for 150
seconds. Authors uses EEG signal and SVM as a verifier in their system. All these work
were performed using multiple-channel EEG devices whereas this work was done using a
single-channel EEG device.
2. Attack models using the EEG signals: One interesting threat model [86] used EEG
signals to leak private data such as a user’s credit card information, date of birth, area of
living, knowledge of persons known to the user, PIN numbers and user’s bank details. The
authors used an EEG gaming device such as Emotiv EPOC to form a potential attack vector
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to infer the secret and private information about the users. Users were shown the visuals of
their personal details and EEG signals were recorded. They used EEG as an external
stimulus whereas we sought to predict brain activity patterns by exploiting interrelation
between hand movements and brain activities as explained in Section 6.2.
3. Authentication using smartwatches: Related work on smartwatch-based
authentication systems have been reported in prior studies [41, 62, 63, 130]. Kumar et al.
[63] described four continuous authentication methods using the characteristics of arm
movements while individuals walk, and achieved Dynamic False Acceptance Rate, and
Dynamic False Reject Rate between 0% and 15% and 0% and 14.62% respectively using
different classifiers. Johnston et al. described a biometric gait recognition technique using
the smartwatch data collected from accelerometer and gyroscope sensors. The classifiers’
accuracy were reported between 92% to 98% for authentication task.
4. Attacks model using smartwatches: In [107], smartwatches with motion sensors were
used to collect data while the users type PINs on a phone. The authors installed a malware
software on the smartwatch, which sent the data of motion sensors to a centralized server set
at remote location via a smartphone. In another work [133] the authors used the smart
watch’s accelerometer and gyroscope readings to identify the words and sentences typed by
the users on a laptop keyboard. They calculated the distance traveled and rotation of the
hand using sensors data. The authors found that when motion signals was combined with
English language patterns (word/sentence), the information leakage was substantial. Other
related works can be found in [23, 83, 84, 90, 133].
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6.7 List of Videos Used in our Study
We used a total of 18 videos in our experiments. The videos were classified in two
different emotion categories; (1) Happy, and (2) Sad. The videos in the Happy category are
expected to invoke happy emotion when watched while videos in Sad category would
invoke sad emotion.

Happy Videos
1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kwZL1YME3Io
2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhaUGwFzjdg
3. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KEiTaH1PN2M
4. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWZkwuILns
5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IESentvtS8o
6. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sxCWB47ZCLQ
7. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q-TQQE1y68c
8. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=92kDUiN1zLQ
9. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CDdl3gatNW0
10. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BKorP55Aqvg
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Sad Videos
1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EEYm2zA7hk
2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=929LlUON04
3. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wgyTBYjc0j8
4. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EZgmj5ay5Bk
5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=stdvLavp5Js
6. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2bk9T482g
7. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5p3fWbEZ8R4
8. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m4p9Xk95vsI

6.8 Discrete Wavelet Transform
Wavelet transforms can be specified in terms of a low-pass filter lp, which satisfies the
standard quadrature mirror condition. The complimentary high-pass filter is hp. A sequence
of filters with increasing length in time domain is expressed as–

lpj+1 (q) = [lp]↑2j lpj (q),

hpj+1 (q) = [hp]↑2j lpj (q)

152
where the symbol [.]↑p indicates the up-sampling by a factor of p, q is equally sampled
discrete time and hp is complementary high-pass filter.
The normalized wavelet and scale basis functions Wj,m (p) and Sj,m (p) are defined as–

Wj,m (p) = 2j/2 ∗ lpj (p − 2i ∗ m)

and

Sj,m (p) = 2j/2 ∗ hpj (p − 2i ∗ m)

where 2j/2 is an inner product normalization, j and m are the scale and translation
parameters respectively. The DWT decomposition is described as–

l(j) (m) = A(p) ∗ Wj,m (p)

and

h(j) (m) = A(p) ∗ Sj,m (p)

l(j) (m) and h(j) (m) are the approximation and detail coefficients at resolution j respectively
[13]. A(p) is the pth sample of the NeuroSky signal A.
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Fig. 6.10.: Sub-band decomposition of DWT implementation. hp[p] high-pass filter, lp[p]
low-pass filter

The multi-resolution decomposition technique of signal A(p) is schematically shown in
Fig. 6.10. Each stage has two digital filters and two down samplers by 2.

6.9 Statistical Significance of Error Rates - Comparative Analysis of the Attack
Performance
Statistical procedure called mixed effects analysis of variance can be used to test the
statistical significance of differences between mean error rates of the attack performance
with original authentication performance. Mixed effects ANOVA test can be performed if
the underlying distribution follows Gaussian behavior. We first used Shapiro-Wilk statistical
significance test under the null hypothesis that the mean EER differences are Gaussian for
each classifiers used in our experiments. We rejected the null hypothesis at the 5%
significance level for all the tests except for SVM(θ = 2.0) and SVM(θ = 2.3). Since,
Shapiro-Wilk test failed to reject these two classifier, we employed K-S test for normality
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for all the classifiers. The procedure resulted in the significance probability less than 10−7
for all the tests. Hence, we rejected null hypothesis for all the pairs.
Table 6.2: Results of statistical test for significance of difference in the mean EERs obtained
for attack with threshold θ = 2.0 and θ = 2.3 by the different machine learning classifiers.
Classifiers
LR (θ = 2.0)
LR (θ = 2.3)
LDA (θ = 2.0)
LDA (θ = 2.3)
NNet (θ = 2.0)
NNet (θ = 2.3)
SVM (θ = 2.0)
SVM (θ = 2.3)

Normality
KS Test
4.47E-07
4.47E-07
3.69E-06
4.50E-06
1.91E-07
4.92E-07
4.16E-07
2.32E-07

p-Value
Performance Test
Friedman Wilcoxon
0.4795
0.085377
0.4795
0.120659
0.004556 0.004615
0.00729
0.018675
0.000101 0.000109
0.033895
0.01847
7.43E-07 1.86E-06
1.14E-07 1.28E-06

Since the mean EER differences does not exhibit Gaussian behavior, we choose to use
Friedman method to test statistical significance in differences of mean EERs. The Friedman
test resulted in the significance probability less than 0.04, for all the pairs except for
LR(θ = 2.0) and LR(θ = 2.3) (see Table 6.2). Therefore we failed to reject the null
hypothesis that the methods are equally accurate on average for RF at the 4% of significance
level. We rejected the null in other cases. We also employed Wilcoxon test with null
hypothesis and draw the same conclusions as Friedman test (see Table 6.2).
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6.10 Conclusion and Future Work
In this study, we have successfully demonstrated that the hand movement patterns and
the brain activity patterns show a strong level of intrinsic correlationships. We have also
showed the possibility of exploiting this correlation to build an attack on the EEG-based
authentication systems, which exposes a previously unknown security threat. Our findings
call for more stringent performance evaluation of EEG-based authentication systems and
motivate research into technologies to build more effective defense against forgery attacks.
Our future work consists of building a sophisticated fusion methodology such that it
improves the present EEG-based authentication mechanism as well as is less venerable to
forgery attacks such as ours. We also plan to examine how the diverse emotional states of a
human affects the attack model.
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7. BODYTAPS: A GESTURE BASED AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM
To fulfill the increasing demands on authentication methods on the smart mobile and
wearable devices with small form factors and constrained screen displays, we introduce a
novel authentication mechanism, Body-Taps, which authenticates a device based on the
Tap-Code gestures in the form of hand movements captured through the built-in motion
sensors. The Body-Taps require a user to set a Tap-Code as an unlock code for the device by
tapping the device on the set anchor points on his or her own body. The target device is
authenticated based on two criterion: (1) the user’s knowledge of the set Tap-Code, and (2)
the Body-Tap gestures measured through the smart device’s built-in motion sensors
(accelerometer and gyroscope). Our experiments show that the proposed Body-Taps system
can achieve an average authentication accuracy over 99.5% on a dataset comprising of 230
Body-Tap samples from 23 subjects, using Random Forest (RF), Neural Network (NNet),
and Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) classifiers. Our work yields a light-weight,
low-cost, and easy-to-use secure authentication system that requires minimal efforts and
offers satisfactory usability.
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Fig. 7.1.: Body-Taps for Tap-Code 1− > 2− > 3− > 4, which can be any combination of
arm and wrist movements (indicated as arrows) between the body anchor Tap Points.
7.1 Introduction
Smart mobile and wearable devices have seen incredibly dramatic growth during the
past ten years. It was projected that approximately 310.4 million wearable devices were sold
worldwide in 2017, which encompasses a variety of device types including smartwatches,
body-worn cameras and head-mounted displays [89]. Along with this market surge, there
have also seen increasing concerns about security and privacy of those personal devices.
That is, how to properly protect and secure those devices against accidental and malicious
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Table 7.1: Anchor Points on the Users Body and the Corresponding Tap Code.
Body Anchor Point
Left Shoulder
Right Shoulder
Left Waist
Right Waist

Tap Code
T ap - P oint1
T ap - P oint2
T ap - P oint3
T ap - P oint4

access. Traditional methods of authentication on mobile devices using pins or passwords
have a number of shortcomings. For example, pins or passwords can be stolen or leaked;
complex pins or passwords are hard to remember and easy passwords are readily guessed,
etc. Another major shortcoming is the difficulty of entering pins or passwords on traditional
devices for visually challenged people. Recent work using hand and wrist movements for
authentication on mobile or wearable devices has shown significant promise and overcome
some of the difficulties. However, the authentication accuracy of those approaches are still
not up to the mark. To this end, in this study we introduce a new, light-weight, user-friendly
authentication technique based on a series of body taps, typically four to six body taps at
key locations of the body, such as the shoulders and each side of the waist (see Figure 7.1).
The proposed approach is specifically designed for those wearable and mobile devices with
small form factors or constrained screen displays.
Figure 7.1 shows an example of wrist movements for entering Tap-Code
1− > 2− > 3− > 4. This involves a sequence of movements; (1) tap the phone at the left
shoulder (T ap − P oint1), (2) tap the phone on the right shoulder (T ap − P oint2), (3) tap
the phone on the left side of the waist (T ap − P oint3), and (4) tap the phone on the right
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side of the waist (T ap − P oint4). Table 7.1 shows the anchor body points used in our design
and the corresponding Tap-Code. Body-Tap gestures captured as the wrist movements by
the motion sensors built within the smart devices provide us with a set of distinguishable
features, which can be used for verifying and authenticating the identity of the user.
Our method thus provides two distinct modes of authentication: one consisting of a pin
through body taps, and the second characterizing the movement patterns between body tap
positions on the body captured through the built-in motion sensors (i.e., accelerometer and
gyroscope). People may question and argue that the body taps can be observed easily and
the accuracy of the motion behavior based authentication would not be sufficient to build a
practical system. In response, we would like to point out that, (1) one can use different
combinations of body taps, thereby providing different combinations of Body-Codes as the
pins; and the purpose of body taps at different locations of the body is to provide a distinct
sequence of flight patterns that involves wrist and arm movements horizontally, vertically,
and diagonally. The security and vulnerability of pins or passwords per say are not the focus
of this work although they do provide a first layer of defense. (2) The discriminability of the
accelerometer and gyroscope based authentication at its worst is comparable to those
reported in the literature and we posit that it will provide an enhanced security level because
of the anthropometric differences. Even if the height and weight of an impostor is similar to
the victim, the arm length and the wrist movement involved in creating the Body-Taps will
provide unique signatures. And, (3) our method provides a much safer option for visually
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impaired people who may traditionally have difficulty of entering pins or passwords or at
worst may completely give up the pins or passwords.
It is argued that, because of the anthropometric variations, such as the geometric
dimensions of the body, specifically the torso, arm length, wrist, even the shape of the hand
and length of the fingers, of one individual from another, a rich set of features can be
captured through the motion sensors (such as the accelerometer and gyroscope) when the
subject holds a phone and taps and moves the hand (and wrist) between different parts of the
body. Our results show that it is possible to successfully authenticate based on hand
movement between body taps.
Moreover, as mentioned above, our method is also of significant use to visually impaired
people, because it requires no explicit pin or password entries. In addition this method is
particularly suitable for the stand-alone authentication scenarios on smart mobile and
wearable devices with small form factors and constrained screen displays.
Contributions: Our work brings forth the following contributions to the field of mobile
devices’ security.
1. We proposed a new authentication mechanism, Body-Taps, which requires minimal
efforts and is suitable for constrained screen devices. Design of the system is such that
it only requires a user to tap the phone at key anchor points on his/her body. The
system creates a user specific template from the features which capture unique
movement of the user’s phone movement for each tap and in between two taps.
System asks the user to enter the previously set Tap-Code (training phase) for the
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verification to gain access to the device. If the matching score is higher than a set user
specific threshold, access is granted otherwise access is denied.
2. We designed, implemented, and rigorously evaluated the Body-Taps system using an
iPhone. In our experiments on a dataset of 230 Body-Taps samples from 23 subjects,
our method could achieve an average authentication accuracy over 99.5% using
Random Forest (RF), Neural Network (NNet), and Linear Discriminant Analysis
(LDA) classifiers.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 presents the related work.
The design of the experiments with data collection and analysis are described in Section 7.3.
We present the performance of our authentication in Section 7.4. Finally, we draw our
conclusions and discuss future directions for the research in Section 7.5.

7.2 Related Work
The majority of user authentication methods are composed of the characteristics that
users possess, e.g., fingerprint, iris [26], palm print [26], gait [49, 93], and context based
behavior analysis [58, 134], what users know such as pins, and passwords or a combination
of both of the above that includes touch based authentication [27, 45], and speech
recognition [26]. These methods have practical limitations as they require extensive
computation power and can be very taxing for mobile phone devices. On the contrary,
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accelerometer and gyroscope based methods do not require excessive computation to
authenticate a device.
Researchers have explored a plethora of motion sensors based authentication schemes
that focus on improving the usability, performance, and memorability to authenticate a
device [44, 68, 69, 88, 101, 132]. The methods based on motion gestures generally follow
two different types of implementations: one relies on the analysis of the position of the
mobile device [38, 42, 50, 75], and the other focuses on the position of the user’s hand [93].
Prior studies [42, 50, 70, 75] have used the accelerometer data in short sessions from either
a customized device or a common Android device.
Kamil Burda [29] presented a new approach to authenticate users based on the way they
picked up a smartphone on a table or in their front pockets, an activity performed frequently
every day, using the smartphones accelerometer sensor. Conti et al. [35] proposed a new
biometric measure to authenticate the user of a smartphone: the movement the user
performed when answering (or placing) a phone call. Luca et al. [36] presented Back of
Device Shapes, an authentication method for smartphones that uses the back of the device
for input. Feng et al. [40] proposed two novel methods, a Statistic Method to intuitively
apply the classifier on the statistic features of the data; and a Trajectory Reconstruction
Method to reconstruct the Mobile Device Picking-up (MDP) motion trajectories and extract
specific identity features from the traces. Kunnathu [65] attempted to build a statistical
model to identify a user, based on how the user picked up the phone and how he/she held the
phone to the ear. Lu et al. [79] proposed a finger-gesture-based authentication method,
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where the in-air-handwriting of each user was captured by wearable inertial sensors. Lee et
al. [69] proposed Secure Pick Up (SPU), to authenticate the users, by implicitly observing
the way they bend their arms when they pick up a smartphone to interact with the device.

7.3 Data Collection and Feature Analysis

7.3.1

Data Collection

With the approval of our university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB), we collected
experimental data from 28 volunteer participants. The participants were informed that their
phone movement patterns would be collected while they entered the chosen Body-Tap-Code
by tapping the phone at the set anchor points on their bodies. We designated the anchor
points corresponding to a Tap-Code as shown in Figure 7.1. Table 7.1 details the body
anchor points and corresponding Tap-Code.
All the participants in our data collection study were university students, faculty, or staff.
We developed an iOS-based application to record the accelerometer and gyroscope
readings. Data recording rate was set to 60 Hz. We collected data in three different sessions;
(1) a pre-training session, (2) a training session, and (3) a testing session.

Pre-training Session
We collected a dataset comprising of 5 different users for a pre-training analysis. We
asked each participant to create Body-Taps for a set of three fixed Tap-Codes. These
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Tap-Codes were designed to cover all the possible combinations of the tap points in our
study, i.e., all possible combinations of taps 1, 2, 3, and 4. Following are the fixed
Tap-Codes that we provided to the participants.
1). 1− > 2− > 3− > 4− > 3− > 2− > 1
2). 1− > 3− > 1− > 4− > 2− > 4− > 1
3). 1− > 1− > 2− > 2− > 3− > 3− > 4− > 4
Every participant created Body-Taps corresponding to the given Tap-Codes, 10 times
each. We recorded the accelerometer and gyroscope readings while user created the
Body-Taps.

Training Session
We recruited 23 different volunteer participants to collect a training dataset. We asked
each participant to chose a Tap-Code and create Body-Taps for the chosen Tap-Code (see
Figure 7.1). Although we did not provide any direction for the length of the Tap-Code,
majority (61%) of the participants chose a tap code of the length 4. Choice of Tap-Code of
length 6 was the second highest majority (35%) in our dataset. The rest 5% participants
chose the Tap-Code of other lengths. We believe that the observed Tap-Code lengths in our
dataset are consistent with the users’ preferences of choosing a pass code for their mobile
devices. Please note that many mobile devices on the market use the standard four or six
digit unlock codes.
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Table 7.2: Average and Standard Deviation of the Time Taken by the Participants to Enter
Body-Tap-Codes.
Tap-Code Swing Type
T ap1 to T ap1 or T ap2 to T ap2
T ap3 to T ap3 or T ap4 to T ap4
T ap1 to T ap2 or T ap2 to T ap1
T ap3 to T ap4 or T ap4 to T ap3
T ap1 to T ap3 or T ap2 to T ap4
T ap3 to T ap1 or T ap4 to T ap2

Time Taken (sec)
Mean (µ) Std (σ)
1.11
0.14
1.23
0.08
1.40
0.17
1.35
0.23
1.69
0.27
1.93
0.31

Testing Session
We invited the same 23 participants, 3 to 5 days after their first participations in the
training session, and asked them to create Body-Taps for the previously chosen Tap-Code.
We again recorded the accelerometer and gyroscope readings as our testing dataset.
Each data collection session was preceded with a practice session with the goal to make
participants familiarize with the device and the chosen Tap-Code. We explained the process
of entering the chosen Tap-Code (i.e., creating the Body-Taps) and allowed each participant
to practice entering Body-Taps for the chosen Tap-Code for 2-3 minutes before the recorded
session.
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7.3.2

Data Preprocessing and Feature Analysis

Data Analysis
We collected the three-axis accelerometer (xacc , yacc , zacc ) and the three-axis gyroscope
(xgyr , ygyr , zgyr ) readings from the phone while user entered the chosen Tap-Code. We
computed the magnitude, macc , for the accelerometer and magnitude mgyr for the gyroscope
which we referred as the fourth component of the accelerometer and the gyroscope signals,
respectively. macc is defined as,

p
2 + z 2 and m
x2acc + yacc
gyr is defined as,
acc

p 2
2 + z2 .
xgyr + ygyr
gyr
The recorded signals were very noisy and hence we performed data smoothing. We used
simple moving average (SMA) with a window size of 5 points for all four components of
the accelerometer and gyroscope signals as a smoothening process.

Tap Points Identification
We closely observed the phone tapping process by users in our pre-training dataset and
noted that a tap consists of the following three action sequences: (1) the phone moves
towards the body anchor point, (2) the subject taps the phone on the anchor point, and (3)
the phone moves away from the body anchor point. The sequence of these three actions also
possesses the unique behavior of movements as observed in our pre-training dataset. The
sensor readings show a clear peak at the Tap Point. We also noted that the zacc component of
the accelerometer readings and the xgyr component of the gyroscope readings were
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Fig. 7.2.: Tap Point Identification. Figure show the accelerometer and gyroscope signal
components zacc and xxyr (top), vertical green lines show the selected peaks of the signals,
identified as Tap-Points (mid), and different Swings separated into short windows (bottom).
Start and End part of the signal (grey shadowed) is discarded for further processing and
features extraction steps.
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ALGORITHM 3: Tap Point Identification Algorithm.
Input: Sensor Signals, zacc (t) and xgyr (t).
Output: {tT apP oints [] | ti , i = 1, 2, ..., (N − 1)}, where N is the length of the
Body-Tap-Code.
for (if at time ti , zacc (ti ), and xgyr (ti ) exist) do
if zacc (ti−1 ) < zacc (ti ) AND zacc (ti+1 ) < zacc (ti ) AND xgyr (ti−1 ) < xgyr (ti ) AND
xgyr (ti+1 ) < xgyr (ti ) then
tCandidate [] ← ti
else
//Do Nothing
end
end
for tj ∈ tCandidate [] do
if (tj+1 − tj ) < T hreshold then
tT apP oints [] ← max(tj , tj+1 )
else
tT apP oints [] ← tj
end
end
return tT apP oints [] //Final Tap Points

sufficient to locate the Tap Points accurately, although there were signal peaks at points
other than the tap points. To identify the peaks corresponding to a tap, we applied a
threshold-based elimination scheme. We observed the mean and standard deviation of the
time taken between two consecutive taps and set a separate threshold as an average for each
swing type. Table 7.2 shows the overall mean and standard deviation of the time taken in a
swing. Based on the above observation, we developed a Tap Point Identification algorithm,
Algorithm 3, to identify the tap points in our dataset. Figure 7.2 shows an example of the
sensor signals, zacc , and xgyr corresponding to a Body-Tap-Code entry. It can be clearly seen
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in the figure that the sensor readings are at peak around the Tap Points. The vertical lines in
green color are marked as the locations of the identified Tap Points.

Mean
Median
Variance
Standard Deviation
Median Absolute Deviation
Inter-Quartile Range
Power
Energy
Peak to Peak Amplitude
Autocorrelation
Kurtosis
Skewness
Spectral Entropy
Median Frequency
Peak to RMS Ratio
Minimum
Maximum
Number of Peaks

Feature Name
xacc
1 (36)
2 (2)
3 (93)
4 (94)
5 (95)
6 (64)
7 (96)
8 (97)
9 (98)
10 (65)
11 (44)
12 (24)
13 (25)
14 (20)
15 (99)
16 (66)
17 (37)
18 (26)

Feature Id for Signal Component
Accelerometer
Gyroscope
yacc
zacc
macc
xgyr
ygyr
zgyr
19 (21)
37 (16) 55 (113) 76 (29)
94 (31)
112 (23)
20 (32)
38 (27) 56 (114) 77 (14)
95 (5)
113 (1)
21 (100) 39 (104) 57 (74)
78 (79)
96 (52)
114 (135)
22 (101) 40 (105) 58 (75) 79 (124) 97 (130) 115 (136)
23 (67) 41 (106) 59 (76) 80 (125) 98 (131) 116 (137)
24 (68) 42 (107) 60 (47) 81 (126)
99 (82)
117 (138)
25 (69) 43 (108) 61 (115) 82 (40)
100 (83) 118 (139)
26 (102) 44 (109) 62 (116) 83 (127) 101 (132) 119 (140)
27 (103) 45 (72) 63 (117) 84 (128) 102 (84)
120 (88)
28 (45) 46 (110) 64 (77)
85 (80)
103 (85) 121 (141)
29 (38) 47 (111) 65 (48)
86 (51)
104 (86)
122 (54)
30 (4)
48 (28) 66 (118)
87 (8)
105 (41)
123 (55)
31 (46) 49 (112) 67 (119) 88 (81) 106 (133) 124 (89)
32 (33)
50 (34)
68 (49)
89 (35)
107 (87)
125 (56)
33 (70)
51 (73) 69 (120) 90 (129) 108 (134) 126 (142)
34 (3)
52 (6)
70 (78)
91 (30)
109 (17)
127 (11)
35 (71)
53 (39) 71 (121)
92 (9)
110 (53)
128 (12)
36 (13)
54 (7)
72 (22)
93 (15)
111 (10)
129 (18)

mgyr
130 (143)
131 (144)
132 (57)
133 (90)
134 (145)
135 (91)
136 (146)
137 (147)
138 (58)
139 (148)
140 (149)
141 (42)
142 (150)
143 (59)
144 (60)
145 (61)
146 (62)
147 (19)

Table 7.3: Features extracted from the accelerometer and gyroscope signals for each swing. Number in a cell is the Feature
ID corresponding to the respective feature and signal component. Feature rank is given inside (.) next to Feature ID.
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Fig. 7.3.: Correlation among the top 63 ranked features, which is referred as Subset 63F in
the chapter.
7.3.3

Feature Extraction

We first divided the smoothed signal into swings based on the tap points identified in the
previous step using Algorithm 3. Entering a body tap code of length N creates N − 1
swings (see Figure 7.2). For example, a body tap code 1− > 2− > 4− > 3 (length N = 4)
would create the following three swings; (1) 1− > 2, (2) 2− > 4, and (3) 4− > 3. In other
words, the first swing is resulted from the tap point T ap1 to the tap point T ap2, the second
swing is resulted from the tap point T ap2 to the tap point T ap4, and the third swing is
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resulted from the tap point T ap4 to the tap point T ap3. We discarded the portions of the
signal before the first tap point and after the last tap point in a Body-Tap-Code entry. Figure
7.2 shows a data sample from a user corresponding to a Body-Tap entry and the process of
dividing the signal into swings. First, it shows the whole signal for the accelerometer
component zacc in red color and for the gyroscope component xgyr in blue color. Next, the
vertical lines in green color (in the middle window) indicate the identified tap points. The
bottom set of windows show the Tap-Code divided into different swings. Note that the first
and last window (shadowed) is part of the Body-Tap entry process but is not part of any
swing. We discarded the start and end signal for each Body-Tap entry signal.
We extracted 150 different features from each remaining window (i.e., swing), and
assigned a unique Feature ID, Fid , to each feature. Table 7.3 lists all the features and the
corresponding Fid . For example, the feature with Fid = 1 is the mean of xacc , the feature
with Fid = 67 is the spectral entropy of macc , and the feature with Fid = 112 is the mean of
zgyr . Feature ID Fid = 73, 74, 75 correspond to the DTW between xacc and yacc , yacc and
zacc , xacc and zacc signals respectively. Also, Feature ID Fid = 148, 149, 150 correspond to
the DTW between xgyr and ygyr , ygyr and zgyr , xgyr and zgyr signals respectively. We refer
to the features with their Fid in the rest of the chapter.
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Fig. 7.4.: Average Classification Accuracy. 31F (blue) represents the average accuracy
obtained using the subset of top 31 features, 35F (cerulean) using the subset of top 35
features, 43F (yellow) using the subset of top 43 features, and 63F (red) using the subset of
top 63 features.
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Fig. 7.5.: Average Precision Score
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Fig. 7.6.: False Accept Rate (FAR) values
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Fig. 7.7.: User Wise Accuracies obtained using feature subset with top 31 features 31F .
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7.3.4

Feature Ranking and Selection

We analyzed the extracted features and carried out a feature ranking and selection step
so as to run our analysis with a compact but informative feature set. This step is also
important to optimize the resource consumption in the target device to execute our
authentication system on those devices as they often have limited resources.
We used the correlation (see Figure 7.3) based attribute evaluator to rank the 150
features in Table 7.3 and systematically select: (1) Feature Subset One (F 92) – the top 92
features, (2) Feature Subset Two (F 63) – the top 63 features, (3) Feature Subset Three
(F 43) – the top 43 features, (4) Feature Subset Four (F 35) – the top 35 features, and (5)
Feature Subset Five (F 31) – the top 31 features. The method heuristically assigned a high
score to a feature attribute subset which had high correlation with the class, and had low
correlation with each other. Rank of each feature is given in Table 7.3 inside brackets (.)
next to their Feature IDs. For example, the feature with Fid = 54 was ranked 7, and the
feature with Fid = 125 was ranked 56 by our feature ranking algorithm. DTW features with
Fid = 73, 74, 75, 148, 149, 150 were ranked 50, 122, 123, 43, 63, 92 respectively.

7.4 Performance Evaluation
We used various classifier implementations from Weka [12] and R[1] to test the
performance of our proposed user authentication model. We computed the classification
accuracy while training the classifiers on our training samples from the training dataset and

Avg. F1-Score (%)
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supplied a test set from the testing dataset1 . Figure 7.4 summarizes the overall classification
accuracy obtained by our system using the Random Forest (RF), k-Nearest Neighbor
(k-NN)2 , Neural Network (NNet), Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), and Support Vector
Machine (SVM) classifiers. The figure shows the effects of the selected feature subsets on
the performance of classifiers. Note that the RF, and NNet based authentication system has
the best overall user classification accuracy in our dataset. Also, we observed that there is no
significant change in the classification accuracy with a reduced feature set.
We also measured F-score, Precision, and recall for each of the system variations. Figure
7.8 shows the average F-Score obtained by the system with each feature subset and each
classifier used. Figures 7.5 and 7.9 show the corresponding precision and recall values
obtained by the system.

7.4.1

User-Wise Performance

We evaluated the system performance for each individual user in our dataset. We trained
the classifiers using the genuine user samples from the training dataset while randomly
selected the impostor samples from other users in the training dataset. For the testing
samples, we used the similar approach and created the testing samples for each user. Figure
7.7 shows the user-wise accuracy obtained based on our dataset of 23 users. Note that for
most of the users, the average accuracy obtained is higher than 99%. For more than 50% of
1
2

The training and test set both comprise of an average of ∼ 200 balanced genuine and impostor samples
The value of k was empirically set to 10 to get optimum classification accuracy in our experiments.
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the users, we obtained the 100% authentication accuracy using the RF, NNet, and SVM
based system. The users #15 and #20 have relatively low average authentication accuracy
with 75% and 82% respectively using LDA and kNN based systems. Also, the discussed
users did not perform well with all 5 tested classifiers. We believe that these users might not
be suitable for our authentication system well and can be removed from the system under
failure to enroll policy.

7.4.2

Error Rates Evaluation

We evaluated our authentication system using the metrics of False Accept Rates (FARs),
False Reject Rates (FRRs), and Equal Error Rates (EERs). Figure 7.6 shows the overall
FARs for each classifier based system on each feature subset. Also, Figure 7.10 shows the
corresponding FRRs of the system. Note that the average error rates are under 1% for RF,
and NNet based systems which are best performing classifiers in our experiments.
Figure 7.11 show the mean EER and standard deviation in EER value using all five
classifiers- RF, kNN, NNet, LDA, and SVM in our experiments. Note that the mean EER
value lies between 0.13% to 0.8% for RF and NNet classifiers. kNN and SVM did not
perform well in our experiments (see Figure 7.11(b) and (e)).
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Fig. 7.11.: Mean EER and standard deviation in mean EER values using RF, kNN, NNet,
LDA, and SVM classifiers.
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7.5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we have introduced a motion sensor-based mobile device authentication
model. The method leverages the unique phone movements corresponding to a user chosen
Tap-Code. The method requires minimal efforts and provides security to the devices and is
robust against traditional pin or password stealing attacks. Based on the results obtained
from 230 Tap-Code samples of 23 different users, we have demonstrated that our model can
achieve a high accuracy with minimal efforts required. Our model is of significant use for
visually impaired users as well as for constrained screen devices where it is very
challenging to enter the traditional pins and passwords on the screen. With the increasing
use of these devices and nature of usage for sensitive transactions, our findings bring the
area a step closer to ensure the security of these devices.

181

8. SUMMARY
We designed attacks which, based on video footage of the positions of the hands and phone
during typing, reconstructs text typed on the touch screen. While the attack could be applied
to other forms of text entry, it is also particularly suited for the pin and password lock
because of the following three factors: (1) People tend to maintain short pins or passwords
implying that the attacker only has to guess a few entries; (2) Given a specific type of phone,
the keypad on which the pin (or password) is entered has a very deterministic design, and
(3) Pin and password entry follows a distinct sequence of actions which permits a distant
observer to easily determine that a given target is entering the Pin (or Password) on the
phone.
While the first factor can be addressed through stringent Pin and Password creation
policies, the last two factors are not bound to change any time soon. Meanwhile, video
cameras, the major tool driving the attack are now everywhere and are only expected to
become even more common over time.
Also the fast emergence of biometrics-based smartphone authentication, took our
attention towards inherently considered hard to spoof EEG-based authentication systems.
We propose to study the correlationship among the hand movements and EEG signals. We
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propose to explore the possibility of exploiting the correlation to build an attack on the
EEG-based authentication systems using hand movement signals and vice-versa.
Also, we introduced a motion sensor-based mobile device authentication model. The
method leverages the unique hand movements corresponding to a user chosen Tap-Code.
The method requires minimal efforts and provides security to the devices and is robust
against traditional pin or password stealing attacks. Based on the results obtained from 230
Tap-Code samples of 23 different users, we have demonstrated that our model can achieve a
high accuracy with minimal efforts required.
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